Hong Kong police forcibly cleared the main protest camp yesterday morning, after more than two months of protests – but the protests have yet to achieve their intended impact as Beijing refuses to remove the nomination committee for selecting the 2017 Chief Executive candidates. This is not the first time the people of Hong Kong have protested against policies issued by Beijing. While the severity and degree of civil participation of this unrest is unprecedented, the likelihood of future success remains low.
The prolonged movement reflects both the accumulated struggles within Hong Kong’s society and the intensified wrestling between the Hong Kong people and their Chinese counterparts. Akos Lada arguedthat hostility is more likely to occur between countries that are culturally similar but with differing political institutions than countries with both different cultures and political institutions. As the ideology gap between Hong Kong and China widens, the political structure and consensus previously established – namely the “one country, two systems” framework – comes under an unprecedented challenge.
A closer look at the movement: a widened ideology gap
Hong Kong has never felt secure ever since their 1997 reversion to China, with the fear of being ruled by a Communist Party acting as a constant threat to the community. The slow accumulation of this threat contributes to the growing strength of the current political unrest. A political protest of this size cannot be dismissed simply as a means to achieve a goal, but instead represents a symbol of something much deeper.
Generally, four reasons explain why this prolonged protest has attracted unprecedented civil participation and international attention. First, Beijing has been meddling in Hong Kong’s affairs with increasing frequency in the recent years. The rationale behind the increased intervention, apart from Hong Kong’s economic and political importance, is a consideration of “returns on investment” to the Mainland: having provided Hong Kong many benefits, a certain level of “obedience” from Hong Kong is to be expected. This sentiment is echoed in a recent article that was popular on the Mainland, “Hong Kong, what does the motherland really owe you,” in which the author compared what Hong Kong has received from the Mainland (tax reductions, special development protection) with what it has given “in return” (anti-China protests, discrimination against Chinese visitors). The internal-security legislation amendment in 2003 and the National Education curriculum in 2012 can be seen as attempts to expand the Mainland’s influence over Hong Kong, but both failed as a result of the intransigent protests. Nevertheless, these attempts threatened the people of Hong Kong and intensified their resentment of the Communist Party rule.
As students make up the majority of those protesting and pushing for democracy, this movement can be likened to the 1989 populist movement which led to the Tiananmen Massacre. Hong Kong is the only place within China that is still able to commemorate that event, which strengthens the “evil” image of the Communist Party and spurs on Hong Kong’s efforts to separate from its sovereign.
Third, the very subject of democracy – which is secured and sometimes won by political protest – is something Hong Kong uses to distinguish itself from the Mainland. Therefore, implementing a truly democratic system to elect their leader is of crucial importance to the people of Hong Kong, both symbolically and practically. However, this insistence reflects a deeper struggle within Hong Kong’s society. To lead by a “patriotic” leader is the elephant in the room for Hong Kong citizens, which they are aware of but refuse to admit. This inner struggle further motivates people to participate in protests more actively.
Lastly, the root cause of the protest stems from the increasing political and social inequality in Hong Kong. As Richard C. Bush III, the Director of the Brookings Center for East Asia Policy Studies pointed out, the economic and political arenas in Hong Kong are dominated by the same group of people (business tycoons who have strongconnections with Beijing), pushing the public to dominate the only arena left: the street.
What makes the fissure even more severe is the negative perception Mainland Chinese have towards their Hong Kong counterparts. In contrast to a generally supportive attitude towards the protesters shown by the western media, Mainland Chinese, through Chinese social media sites, have expressed their support for Beijing to take stronger action against the protestors.
Media censorship contributes to the mostly one-sided attitude of Mainlanders. The negative commentary generated from Mainland China is thus a product of a national ideology formed by a highly-centralized political regime and the lessons learned from the past.
The Chinese authorities have undermined the legitimacy of this democratic movement by labeling the sit-in as an “illegal gathering” and claiming it is being manipulated by foreign powers, thereby disrupting Hong Kong’s economy and social order. These two re-framing strategies echo a very important value Mainlanders recognize as a major contributor to China’s current prosperity: social stability. Elder generation Chinese who have undergone years of political turbulence treasure this hard-won stability, and in exchange, turn a blind eye on political rights abuses. The value of stability – which is also espoused in traditional Chinese philosophy – has become deeply rooted within Chinese culture and is a big part of the national ideology. The reciprocal relationship between media censorship and ideology makes a drastic shift in ideology in China even more difficult.
Chinese authorities will never allow the movement to be positively portrayed within the Mainland, fearing the spillover effect will tempt Mainland Chinese to ask for the same election rights. The national ideology simultaneously helps reinforce the image of Hong Kong citizens as spoiled children who claim an unreasonable superiority and hold a dream too ideal to be realized. Meanwhile, Beijing is unlikely to concede, which may trigger more obstinate resistance from Hong Kong. Thus, the growing tension will reinforce the existing ideology gap, pushing both parties to continue undermining the legitimacy of its counterpart.
Re-examining “one country, two systems”: assimilation or complementation?
“One country, two systems,” the constitutional principle formulated by Deng Xiaoping, functioned as a temporal mental relief for most of the threatened Hong Kong people upon the reversion to China. However, the framework met with some challenges recently as the tension between Hong Kong and China intensified. A survey conducted by the University of Hong Kong’s public opinion program showed that the proportion of respondents lacking confidence in the formula (56% lacking confidence, compared to 38% confident) was at its highest since polling began in 1993.
When reviewing the substance of “one country, two systems,” one should re-examine the Basic Law, which regulates the conduct of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). Although a high degree of autonomy is granted throughout, the Basic Law reflects the intricate and nuanced balance that the central government seeks between granting autonomy and casting control. For example, while the HKSAR enjoys its judicial independence, the laws enacted by the HKSAR Legislative Council must be reported to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee in Beijing. The above provision, as suggested by James C. Hsiung in his article “The Hong Kong SAR: Prisoner of Legacy or History’s Bellwether?” indicated that the sovereign’s superordinate power over the SAR is necessary to “ensure that the SAR’s new law be compatible and consistent with both the Basic Law and the wills of the sovereign.”
The balance needed for the functionality of the framework requires efforts from both sides. Within the first two years after Hong Kong’s reversion, Beijing did not meddle in Hong Kong’s internal affairs. Nonetheless, Beijing’s non-interventionism was not only a result of self-restraint under the framework, but more importantly, a result of a “well-behaved” Hong Kong. As argued by Hsiung, “the credit should go to everyone in the territory, including the demonstrators, who apparently acted within the bounds of the legally acceptable.”
Hong Kong desires “two systems,” while China emphasizes “one country” – and when both sides pursue separate frameworks, the previously-established political equilibrium comes under even greater stress.
After Xi Jinping – a previously amenable politician – became the President of China in 2012, the country launched a large-scale anti-corruption campaign domestically, expanded its military expenses, and demonstrated a stronger stance on sovereignty issues internationally. All of these provocative actions portrayed an image of a new, awakening, and stronger China. As Chinese scholar Wei Zhang stated, Chinese President Xi will continue to take a stronger stance, and if needed, Xi may collapse the “one country, two systems” to consolidate his power. Bao Tong, the secretary of Zhao Ziyang (third Premier of People’s Republic of China), stated in an interview that while Xi Jinping’s ideology on economic liberalization is similar to that of Deng Xiaoping, his thoughts on power centralization are more akin to those of Mao Zedong.
But does disparity necessarily mean conflict? Bush suggested that Beijing could be more creative when dealing with this issue: Hong Kong is actually a desirable policy “laboratory” for Mainland China when Beijing designs its future political reform. Minky Worden, the director of Global Initiatives for the Human Rights Watch, suggested that the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong could be used as a great model for the Mainland to fight corruption. From that perspective, the “one country, two systems” framework is a complementarity rather than an attempt to force Hong Kong to adopt ideological and political differences.
The Hong Kong democratic movement is a tough test for China. Whether to threaten the integrity of the “one country, two systems” framework by continuously delaying a democratic election or to use the framework as a contract that promotes political experimentations largely depends on the vision of the Chinese leaders. An article in The Economist, “What China wants,” states “China has shown both flexibility and unyielding resolve in its continued pursuit of wealth and power since 1978. Now those goals are within reach and China stands on the verge of greatness. The next few decades may prove to be the most difficult of all.” China’s policy towards Hong Kong still reflects conservatism and emphasis on social stability. However, endless repression certainly cannot bring the nation a sustainable “greatness.” Learning how to strategically reconcile competing ideologies and find complementary opportunities between different political systems is difficult and risky, but it may be the best way out.
Xiang Li is a first year student at the McCourt School of Public Policy.