President Vladimir Putin introduced a series of amendments to the Russian Constitution that will dramatically enhance the power of the presidency. His reforms will increase the president’s control over the judiciary and the legislature, and reduce Parliament’s power.
On Jan. 15 President Vladimir Putin announced a number of constitutional amendments in his Federal Assembly annual address to alter the balance of power of the government after his presidency ends in 2024. Putin’s proposed amendments would create new opportunities for him to rule Russia for the rest of his life. A series of startling events followed Putin’s speech: the forced resignation of the prime minister and the cabinet members, an unexpected appointment to the new prime minister position, and the creation of cryptic legislation. News of Putin’s speech and the forced resignation of the government members spread globally. As a result, social media, political commentators and news outlets began to develop a variety of theories regarding Putin’s intentions. On Mar. 10 Russia’s lower house of the parliament approved a constitutional amendment that would extend President Putin’s rule until 2036, allowing him two more terms as the president. The heart of the debate is what will happen to Putin at the end of his term in 2036. Although Putin’s plan for the end of his presidency remains unknown, his constitutional reforms will strengthen the centralization of power in the Russian presidency.
President Putin’s History of Centralized Power
Putin, a former KGB intelligence officer, has been the central authority figure of Russia since 2000. He has discovered ways to retain the highest authority of power by circumventing the term limit rule in the Russian Constitution, which has been the framework of the Russian Federation for over two decades. Specifically, the Russian Constitution allows a president to serve two nonconsecutive terms. However, Putin bypassed the term limit by stepping down to become the prime minister after his presidential term in 2004. He continued to maintain considerable influence as the prime minister. Four years later, in 2012, Putin was reelected as president along with a law that extended Putin’s presidential term to six years, thus ending his term in 2024. Putin noted in his annual address that there will be a major change in the balance of power. Cyrus Newlin, Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia program in the Center for Strategic and International studies claims that Putin intends to maintain a strong presidency rather than a parliamentary republic. President Putin’s political history demonstrates that he has always pushed for a more unified system.
Constitutional Change: Strengthening the Presidency
The presidency is already the strongest institution in Russian government. Putin’s reforms grant the presidency new powers in the judicial and legislative selection process. In particular, the president can demand that the Federation Council (the upper house of the parliament) dismiss justices in the Supreme and Constitutional courts. The judiciary is made up of three courts: the Constitutional courts, the regular courts (the highest of which is the Supreme Court), and the appellate courts (High Court of Arbitration is the highest). Originally, the judiciary was intended to be an independent branch, but the reform will lessen their independence by allowing for political influence. The president can arbitrarily replace judges, which will undermine the legitimacy of any decision by the courts. Furthermore, judges will obey the wishes of the president, or otherwise be removed.
Another one of Putin’s reforms will increase the president’s veto power. Currently, when a president vetoes a law the legislature can override the veto. After the constitutional reform, the president will have the power to appeal the legislature’s override in the Constitutional Court. This new process will give the president another chance to veto the law. The president’s new opportunity to override a veto in court, combined with the president’s ability to dismiss justices from the judiciary, gives the president a stronger role in the law-making process.
Putin also proposed requirements that would restrict the presidential candidacy, such as a 25 years of residency, and a limit of two terms. The reforms will include the removal of the word “consecutive” from the constitution to prevent future presidents from running again, which was used by Putin to run for President twice. Although the presidential requirements may appear as an impediment for Putin’s acquisition of power, the requirements will not hinder the centralization of power, which is his primary intent. By imposing candidacy requirements, he can narrow the number of candidates and guarantee the election of the successor that is most loyal to him. Furthermore, limiting presidents to two terms will rest Putin’s presidential terms to zero and enable him to run for president again. Putin’s goal is not to dominate the system, but to find a method to exert influence without risking a dangerous consequence for the state.
Constitutional Reform: Weakening Parliament
To combat criticism of the reforms, Putin attempted to create an impression that his constitutional reform will also increase the role of Parliament. However, Tatiana Stanovaya, founder and head of the Russian think tank R.Politik, claims that the Parliament will not have a bigger role in policymaking. Instead, the reforms will cause only minor changes in the procedure for appointing prime ministers. Under the current Constitution, the State Duma – the lower chamber of the parliament – has the power to approve both the prime minister and executive cabinet members proposed by the president. If the president’s candidate is rejected three times, the entire State Duma is dismissed and there is a new election. In other words, members of the lower chamber are faced with two options: vote for the appointment or be removed from the parliament. Furthermore, the majority of the seats within the State Duma are members of the United Russia party, which is loyal to Putin. Thus, opposition to the president’s appointment seems unlikely. The reforms will only change the semantics of the appointing procedure from “approve” to “confirm,” – the procedure will not change.
The most drastic reforms will be applied to the Federation Council, which is the upper chamber of the parliament. The original Constitution requires the Federation Council to approve the president’s appointment of a foreign minister. However, under the new reforms, the president will no longer need the Federation Council’s approval, just their consultation. The upper chamber will lose their right to deny a presidential appointment. Ultimately, the purpose of the parliamentary reforms is to remove potential opposition against the president’s ruling establishment.
Constitutional Reform: Establishment of the State Council
Another notable amendment in Putin’s constitutional reforms is the codification of an advisory body to the president, known as the State Council. Created in 2000, the advisory body was designed to compensate regional governors for being ousted from the Federation Council. Although the State Council has proved to be ineffective for 18 years, it has allowed governors to directly communicate with the president. Then in 2018, the advisory body became an assembly of elite members to coordinate national projects. Putin can gather ministers, presidential administrative staff, experts and CEOs to discuss policymaking initiatives. Despite the elite gathering, the State Council does not have the power to implement its decisions. However, after the reform, the advisory body will be formed by the President and will “facilitate coordination between state bodies to determine key areas of domestic and foreign policy.” In other words, the State Council will directly advise and serve the President and set the direction of Russia’s foreign and domestic policy. The powers of the State Council are vague and broad, which leaves room for interpretation of powers. It is certainly a possibility that Putin will head the State Council after the expiration of his presidential term in 2036 and continue to advise future presidents.
Conclusion
President Putin’s recent constitutional reforms dramatically increased the power of the presidency. Given that the reforms will enable the president to override Parliament’s vetoes, dismiss the Supreme court and Constitutional Court Judges, remove the the Federation Council’s approval of a prime minister appointment, and maintain influence in foreign policy through a State Council, it can be concluded that opposition against the president will be unlikely. In light of his presidential term extension until 2036, the reforms indicate that Putin will continue to develop the government around the presidency. He has already created avenues to retain the highest power. The centralization of power supports the argument that Putin will remain in power through the position as the head of the State Council, after the end of his presidency. Along with the State Duma’s approval of his constitutional amendments, the Russian voters have also decided to support Putin’s reforms. Over three-fourths of the voters have backed a referendum on constitutional changes. Thus, he will have another opportunity to run for president after his tenure. Furthermore, the referendum has also strengthened the State Council, which will provide another opportunity for Putin’s rule. By becoming the head of a broadly-defined governing body, he could potentially hold a supervisory role over the entire political system as long as the president remains loyal to him. Even after his death, these constitutional amendments will preserve the idea of a centralized authority figure instead of a democratic society. The Constitutional overhaul will ingrain Putin’s legacy in Russian politics.
