Pictured: President Ma Ying-Jeou of Taiwan meets with President Xi Jinping in 2015.
The recent Taiwanese elections have reignited international political discourse on the possibility of war in the Taiwan Strait. Given the historical complexities of Taiwan-China relations and the role they play in U.S. foreign policy, many U.S. foreign policy (USFP) experts are predicting imminent conflict in the region. However, this is a significant miscalculation of Beijing’s appetite for war. USFP officials commonly misinterpret Chinese domestic politics and dynamics, especially concerning Taiwan. Furthermore, almost two years after the outbreak of war in Ukraine, USFP commentators still falsely draw parallels between Ukraine and Taiwan and underestimate the power of Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield.”
Xi’s rhetoric on Taiwan is strategic political posturing
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s stated intention to reunite Taiwan with China is closely tied to his desire to consolidate power over the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Early in his tenure, Xi has strategically cultivated support within the CCP to dismantle presidential term limits, diverging from Deng Xiaoping’s tradition of orderly and institutionalized power transitions. In his address during the CCP’s centenary ceremony, he affirmed his policy of pursuing peaceful national reunification but did not reveal the timeline for doing so. This omission implies that Xi’s discourse serves primarily as a mechanism to solidify internal CCP support, rather than as a definitive roadmap for action. Bang Xiao, a reporter and analyst on Chinese affairs, postulates that showing ambition to take Taiwan will “cement Xi’s place as a remarkable person in China’s history” – indicating how his ambitious messaging on Taiwanese reunification is a political power play. The possibility of reunifying Taiwan and China is an emotive issue for Chinese citizens. Xi’s rhetoric is pandering to these emotions to appeal to his citizens and engender support within the CCP, without clearly signaling a commitment to actualize the reunification of China and Taiwan.
Furthermore, Beijing recognises that invading Taiwan would result in international isolation and condemnation, including but not limited to sanctions and embargoes from Western nations. This could reverse Beijing’s efforts to expand power and influence, and dampen Xi’s global ambitions. Economic interdependence is China’s key vulnerability, since the CCP’s legitimacy rests on its ability to maintain social, political and economic stability within China and its trade and economic stability rests on the global market.
China and Taiwan do not mirror Russia and Ukraine
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine a year ago has led many USFP commentators to draw a comparison to China’s approach toward Taiwan; however, Russia’s direct military aggression contrasts with China’s blend of diplomatic pressure and military preparedness. Although the war in Ukraine is a stark reminder that the threat of cross-border conflicts is omnipresent, Taiwan and Ukraine differ geopolitically, historically and strategically. The only real parallel is that both countries are exposed to a large, aggressive authoritarian neighbor. Taiwan is separated from China by the 180 km long Taiwan Strait, compared to the long land border between Russia and Ukraine. An invasion by China would be logistically more arduous than Russia’s invasion into Ukraine and would require a large number of ships heavily laden with equipment, which would be vulnerable to attacks. The slow pace of these vessels would expose them to long-range missile strikes, submarine assaults, and other forms of advanced weaponry. Harlan Ullman, a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council, emphasizes that to counter Taiwan’s potential 45,000 defense force, China would need to mobilize over 1.2 million soldiers from its active military personnel, which exceeds 2 million. However, the Chinese Navy possesses only a fraction of the necessary artillery to facilitate an invasion of that magnitude.
In addition, due to the historical association between Taiwan and the U.S., as enshrined in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. is the island’s primary security partner. This heightens the global consequences of conflict between China and Taiwan, to a far greater extent than the war in Ukraine. Regardless of China’s increasing military assertiveness, the U.S.’ de facto alliance with Taiwan acts as “diplomatic deterrence” against China. The Center for Strategic International Studies’ military experts even predict total destruction of an invading Chinese militia by a U.S.-led coalition before any occupation of Taiwan could occur.
Contrary to what might be inferred from Moscow and Beijing’s announcement of a no-limits partnership, the two states also follow different strategies to advance their interests. China’s strategic priority of peaceful unification with Taiwan follows the dream of a one-China principle, and Chinese rhetoric stresses the maintenance of a peaceful environment while pursuing its historical mission of territorial expansion. In line with this, China has emphasized soft economic inducements as much as hard diplomatic and military pressure. By contrast, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was an aggressive attempt to secure its “near abroad” and counter NATO’s expansion – an aim driven by Moscow’s perception of a swiftly deteriorating strategic environment. This fostered a sense of urgency and hardened Moscow’s appetite for war.
Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield”
Many USFP commentators predict that China will invade Taiwan to assume control of its cutting-edge microchip and semiconductor industry. However, this industry, home to 92% of the world’s most advanced production of semiconductors, acts as a “Silicon Shield” against the possibility of an invasion as global economic dependence on this technology magnifies the importance of peace and stability. China imports 40% of the global supply of semiconductors and, even though it invests heavily in its domestic capability, relies on Taiwanese production to prop up its booming $228.30 billion electronics industry.
Furthermore, China mines 72% of the world’s silicon, an integral component for semiconductors, which illustrates the interdependence of China and Taiwan’s economies. Beijing is highly strategic and understands that even a Chinese naval blockade would severely restrict trade, exacerbating global economic tensions, causing dramatic supply-chain disruptions and leading to trillion dollar losses in economic output. At worst, military conflict would risk destroying Taiwan’s semiconductor industry and seriously harm China’s own economy.
While USFP commentators should not underestimate the potential for Chinese military expansion, they should also understand the nuances in Beijing’s posture towards Taiwan. A false interpretation of Chinese domestic politics could result in inaccurate comparisons between Russia-Ukraine and China-Taiwan that could, in turn, provoke USFP actions that overstep China’s red line.
Photo attribution: 總統府, CC BY 2.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
I’d like to believe you, but we don’t have to look as USFP, but the actions of the Chinese Navy with the almost daily occurrence of Taiwanese airspace and naval encroachment. And it is not just Taiwan, but the Philippines too. China is the bully on the playground and they will get away with their actions until they get hit in the nose. Will there be war then? Maybe because then their will be political pride involved. I think you are completely wrong.
Another thing, why do everyone attribute “historical complexities” to conflicts? Ukraine/Russia is quite simple, Israel/Iran is quite simple, and China/South Pacific is quite simple. The most simplest of them all is China/Taiwan.