The current framework for stability operations of the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DoS) outlines the appropriate division of labor between military and civilian agencies, but the ability to implement such divisions primarily rests with the executive branch. Due to its size and funding levels, DoD has not only adhered to its own legally defined responsibilities but now undertakes civilian duties as well, due to under-resourcing in other government departments. DoS has simultaneously fallen behind on its own stabilization duties as it continues to face funding challenges. On both accounts, presidential leadership plays a key role in strengthening (or undermining) each agency’s approach to and capacity for conducting stability operations.
Background
The latest U.S. government stabilization principles are laid out in the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) released by DoS, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and DoD in early 2018. The SAR framework defines stabilization as “a political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence.” Essential activities categorized as stabilization include security, public order, provision of immediate human needs, governance and economic stability.
Legal Roles
White House leadership sets the agenda for how DoD and DoS interpret each of their roles in stability operations through presidential directives, signed or authorized by the President to outline the executive branch’s role related to Article II powers and national security. With the executive branch as the lead for national security policy making, changes in administration often result in changes in policy priorities. The Clinton administration addressed problems of coordination in the early 1990s by providing a civilian-military framework in Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), but this was done away with when Bush assumed the presidency in 2001. U.S. policy in Iraq, for one, was then established as primarily a military mission with no broad objectives for interagency collaboration.The U.S. then faced challenges in implementing successful governance-related activities in Iraq when DoD and DoS (among other agencies) each individually worked to build the capacity of Iraq’s ministries to carry out their stated governance functions without coordinating their strategies.
DoD’s stabilization obligations also fall under international law in certain circumstances. DoD Directive 3000.05 outlines guidance on stabilization responsibilities and requires the military to lead stability-related efforts with “proficiency equivalent to combat operations.” The DoD’s lead over ongoing stabilization efforts (in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example) fall under these legal classifications.
In contrast, the under-resourcing of the State Department constrains its ability to meet key responsibilities as the lead for country political strategy and stabilization. An assessment of the capability gap in 2008 found that for every DoS official, nearly 30 DoD military and civilian personnel were deployed overseas. The Obama administration tried to unite the efforts of the two departments, however this did not translate to strengthened coordination, as was the case in Libya in 2011 – where DoS took the lead in meeting with local opposition and planning a no-fly zone but passed implementation guidance to DoD. This demonstrated a lack of clear chains of command and weakened the overall U.S. strategy. The Trump administration decreased DoS funding by at least 20% in the years following its inauguration. Whether the Biden administration will restore funding remains to be seen, however, the department’s continued resource constraints prevent DoS officials from fulfilling their key stabilization responsibilities, particularly in recent years.
Reorientation of Appropriate Roles
The simultaneous expectation that DoD execute stabilization activities to the same standard as combat operations while DoS remains underfunded has resulted in an increased role for the U.S. military in stabilization efforts that it is not equipped to carry out. Jahara Matisek noted that “using the U.S. military to fill the gaps left by an under-resourced DoS undermines American foreign policy goals and does not build stable partner states.” In Iraq, when DoD led planning efforts in stability operations, they entered with no past experience in building local governments and did not have good relationships with the NGOs on the ground. This contributes to the difficulties in achieving lasting stability in post-conflict environments.
Research such as Robinson et al.’s study points to a misalignment between the core missions of the two agencies and their current roles in stabilization. The military, whose central mission relates to security, takes on the highest level of U.S. involvement overseas. DoS officials, with their expertise in the subject and regional matters relating to foreign conflict and their program management skills, are involved in limited capacities in the very areas of their core competencies. The SAR report was conceived with this argument in mind, but given its recent adoption across the civilian-military realms, the U.S. government’s true commitment to it remains to be seen. Up until this point, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have generally followed the Bush doctrine of military primacy. Biden’s decision to withdraw all U.S. troops from Afghanistan by September signals a shift in foreign policy, and may indeed represent a re-evaluation of military approaches to difficult engagements abroad (particularly since the drawdown is not conditions-based), though this remains to be seen.
Should the vulnerabilities of DoS resourcing and institutional support remain, the U.S. may continue defaulting to DoD as the leader in stabilization efforts. But bigger is not always better. Despite the military’s size and capabilities, their expertise in security is not easily translatable to all stabilization missions, as demonstrated by the post-invasion efforts in Iraq. The deployment of military resources to conflict areas is necessary: without security, stabilization efforts stand on shaky ground and civilian agencies cannot reproduce the same security outcomes. However, to achieve lasting and desired political outcomes, the core competencies of the State Department are required. The President is uniquely positioned to set the tone for interagency collaboration, and their leadership is key to ensuring the State and DoD adhere to their intended roles. The Biden Administration must consider options to engage the interagency in a thorough review of stability missions abroad, with a focus on how to better support diplomatic and political efforts housed (and ready to be funded) in the State Department.
Lia is originally from the Philippines and graduated from The College of New Jersey with bachelor's degrees in Political Science and Russian Studies. She has worked in government and think tank spaces. Currently, Lia works in the nonprofit sector in Washington, DC on national security and higher education programs. She is interested in the federal policymaking process, immigration and women’s issues, and national security and foreign policy.