Militaries have increasingly opened combat roles to women, but critics warn this will lower standards and effectiveness. Historical evidence suggests integrating women into combat roles would not impact effectiveness, and perhaps even increase it under certain circumstances.
From the Biblical prophet-general Deborah, to anti-Roman rebel queen Boudica, to Soviet sniper ace Lyudmila Pavlichenko, history is filled with legendary female warriors. These women, however, are exceptions to a historical norm: an overwhelming number of militaries excluded women from service.
In recent years, multiple countries have altered their policies to allow women to serve in combat roles. In 2015, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter opened all military roles to women. In the same year, India allowed women to become fighter pilots. Famous for being the world’s only country with a mandatory draft for both men and women, Israel inaugurated its first mixed-gender combat unit, the Caracal Battalion, in 2000.
Despite these developments, militaries remain cautious about fully integrating women into combat units. For example, in the United States, 600 women entered combat roles in 2018, yet men still outnumber women about five-fold in the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and 15-fold in the Marine Corps.
I explore the debate over the integration of women into combat roles. I analyze two instances of female participation in combat operations: a Russian women’s battalion in World War I and Soviet airwomen in World War II. I conclude having women in combat does not lower military effectiveness.
The debate over integrating women into combat units
Some claim to oppose integration because women cannot reach the same physical fitness levels as their male counterparts. A 2015 U.S. Marine Corps report evaluated several combat effectiveness criteria, such as speed, marksmanship, and casualty evacuation and found “all-male squads” generally performed better than “gender-integrated squads.” The Center for Military Readiness, a nongovernmental organization opposed to gender integration for combat units, cited various physiological differences in men and women that made the latter less physically able to participate in combat units. Such critics lament attempts to integrate women would necessitate lowering military standards, decreasing effectiveness.
Others argue integration would compromise discipline and morale. In his book, On Killing, former US Ranger Lt. Col. Dave Grossman notes instances when the Israeli military avoided putting women and men in close combat together because of the possible psychological effect on men witnessing the injury of their fellow female soldiers. Critics also cite the “eros” argument – that introducing women into combat units would bring sexual tension that may erode unit cohesion.
Proponents of integration assert judging women by standards made by and for men while forcing women to wear uncomfortable gear made for male bodies is an unfair metric by which to determine fitness. “Gender neutral” fitness tests that do not dilute their standards can rid militaries of arbitrary gendered biases without sacrificing military quality. Further, it is disingenuous to make eros a “woman problem” when sexual tensions among men has long been a feature of military affairs.
Women in combat operations
The historical record contains further evidence for integrating women. If critics of integration are right, one should observe lower combat effectiveness, specifically in physical performance and morale, in all-female or mixed-gender units than all-male ones. I focus on two historical cases: the 1st Russian Battalion Women’s Battalion of Death’s performance in a Russian offensive near Smorgon, and Soviet Airwomen’s performance in World War II.
In 1917, Russian commanders authorized the creation of the 1st Russian Women’s Battalion of Death, led by Maria Bochkareva. In July, the battalion participated in an offensive against German trenches near Smorgon. According to Bochkareva’s autobiography and other corroborating sources, the Women’s Battalion was the first of the Russian units to go over the top of the Russian trenches and advance across no man’s land under heavy fire. Although initially hesitant, the male units quickly followed the battalion’s lead, overcoming two German trench lines before Bochkareva perceived the vulnerability of a third and pressed her soldiers forward to swiftly seize it. Ordered to hold the lines and await reinforcements, the battalion repulsed a number of counterattacks of numerically superior German forces and retreated only when Russian commanders informed Bochkareva reinforcements would not arrive and ordered her to withdraw.
Likewise, during World War II, the Soviet Union formed three all-female and mixed-gender air regiments. They operated continuously between 1942 and 1945, allowing for comparison with other Soviet air units. Overall, the three regiments flew about 30,000 sorties and two of the three were granted the elite “guards” designation. Two of the pilots were recognized as “aces” and 31 airwomen decorated as “heroes of the Soviet Union.”
The most decorated of the three, the 588th Air Regiment, flew a remarkable total of 24,000 sorties, considerably above the typical sortie rate for Soviet air regiments. The performance of the 588th instilled fear in their German adversaries, earning it the nickname “Night Witches.” Supporting ground crews, largely comprised of women, hauled many tons of ammunition, heavy bombs, and other supplies to rapidly prepare aircraft for bombing missions, often loading several tons in a single night while exposed to subzero temperatures. Despite the design of aircraft to accommodate larger male bodies, female pilots handled their planes superbly.
Analysis of female unit combat performance
These two cases reveal female soldiers not only can perform as well as men in combat, but also may exceed men even under physically demanding circumstances. Bochkareva demonstrated outstanding tactical leadership and her soldiers showed bravery and an ability to respond deftly to rapidly changing circumstances. Indeed, after mounting a successful offensive and pressing their advantage, the 1st Women’s Battalion adeptly transitioned to a defensive posture, turned their flanks to meet enemy maneuvers, and repelled numerically superior forces. Female and mixed Soviet air regiments often surpassed the performance of their male counterparts in physically demanding sortie rates and logistical operations.
The presence of women and men in the field together had a positive effect on morale. Bochkareva’s battalion led the charge across no man’s land, inspiring male soldiers to follow. Although initially resentful, Soviet airmen came to regard their female counterparts with appreciation, solidifying cohesion and morale by garnering trust among units that would need to support one another in combat.
The eros argument is more difficult to assess. Since these units were mostly or all-female, there was little opportunity for them to interact with their male counterparts. However, the fact that the longest-standing all-women force was the most effective of the three Soviet air regiments stands as evidence against excluding women from combat roles.
Policy implications
While it is important to debate the ramifications of physical fitness testing and how integration affects unit dynamics, assessing actual combat experience is crucial. Without the empirical evidence the “audit of battle” reveals, any assessment of integration will be purely theoretical. Ultimately, the best way to assess how integration affects combat effectiveness is to allow women to fight alongside men and see how they do. The historical cases I have analyzed suggest this is not a bad idea. One may find further evidence for this in the Kurdish Women’s Protection Units’ participation in the Syrian Civil War and women in the Zionist militias during the Israeli Independence War.
From a policy perspective, this means governments are taking the right steps by opening more combat roles to women. As they do so, governments should also collate statistics on combat effectiveness and levels of unit integration to monitor the relationship between degrees of integration and changes in effectiveness. Further research should analyze other cases of women’s participation in combat.
Ido Levy is the editor-in-chief of Georgetown Public Policy Review. He is a second-year MPP student at the McCourt School of Public Policy. He earned a BA in government from Israel’s IDC Herzliya. He has completed research work for the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Institute for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, and Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. After graduating, he hopes to enter the security research world through a think tank or academia.
This is a superbly unique analysis of the issue. Clear & informative. It is flawless & as ex officer in the Israeli Army I can only salute.
Analyzing and placing women in the right positions where they can be most effective is another thing and must be addressed professionaly via trial & error and different criteria. I.e – different design for women’s gear & other considerations.
Thank you Ido ! I was worried about women in the military. I no longer worry . I’m proud . Your article is excellent. Informative and clear .