Inequality and government repression in India led to the establishment of the Maoist Naxalite insurgency in the 1960s. Today, the insurgency is weakened, but political parties such as the CPI(M) have taken up their goals. India’s national government remains committed to fighting the insurgency through development programs, but it has yet to retake the “red corridor.” This article is the final in a trio on South Asian insurgencies.
Origins of the Naxalite insurgency
The roots of Maoist insurgency in India lie in the Naxalite movement. The Naxalite insurgency commenced in 1967 in the village of Naxalbari in Western Bengal, India, after a confrontation between government forces and Maoists. After a tribal communist killed a local state worker, the government responded disproportionally, killing many local people in the village (including women and children). The government response was viewed as excessive by locals, causing many villagers to form an insurgency in protest. Later, the word “Naxals” became shorthand for Maoist insurgents.
In addition to this incident, underlying structural issues across the country helped kindle the Naxalite insurgency. Namely, India’s socio-economic situation, which was mainly perpetrated by the Hindu caste system, created class tensions. The hierarchical caste system, which mainly benefits the upper class, was exploited by British colonists and continued post-independence. Large inequalities developed after decades of subjugation, particularly in relation to landownership. Additionally, the areas controlled by the Naxalites (often labeled as the “red corridor”) have a disproportionate concentration of lower-caste populations of Dalits and Adivasis and are segregated from the more developed regions of the country, making it easy for them to obtain recruits.
The crackdown on Naxalites and inception of the People’s War Group
Despite their early push, the Naxal movement lost speed by the 1970s after two leaders were apprehended. By 1972, almost all the leaders in the higher echelons of the insurgency had been imprisoned or killed by the Indian government. Nevertheless, the movement was undeterred: as their leaders were discharged from imprisonment by the 1980s, about 30 new Naxalite groups had been formed across India. Their communist ideology later spread to the Andhra Pradesh region, where they were welcomed by peasants who struggled with issues surrounding land rights.
In 1980, the Naxalite-inspired People’s War Group (PWG) in Andhra Pradesh started forming “people’s courts” through which they exercised quasi-legal authority in the region. They also aimed to arm local tribal leaders who were often oppressed by national government officials. At the same time, the Maoist Communist Center, a faction of the Naxalites mainly comprising of trade union activists, grew in the region as well.
The PWG also realized that the conditions in Andhra Pradesh were well-suited for guerilla warfare. They focused their recruitment in areas of economic deprivation. The Naxalites emphasized recruiting the tribal poor, including the low-caste Dalit and the Adivasis. In addition to Andhra Pradesh, the insurgency expanded towards Bihar, which has a similar caste social structure. Naxalites here recruited the underprivileged class, specifically the Dalits, a caste regarded as one that is “untouchable” within the Hindu system. The Naxalite leadership, upon their resurgence in the 1980s, supported people in the region who were suffered losses from land and feudal conflicts.
The emergence of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) and government’s response
While the insurgency remains a problem in some regions of India, the Naxalites have not been successful in creating a nationwide movement. The Naxalites still command the red corridor, which spans 223 districts in 20 states, but the Indian government has started numerous socio-economic programs in regions affected by the Naxals. For instance, they initiated the “Backward Districts Initiative” between 2003 and 2004, which provided a total of approximately 2,500 crores (Rupees) to accelerate socioeconomic development that would in turn confront Naxals as well. This program has expedited development practices, including rural road connectivity, in many of these regions. States have also offered large incentives for the Naxals to surrender including cash for the weapons they surrender, life insurance, vocational training, and land.
Today, Naxalism is understood more as a dissension rather than “insurgency” movement. Additionally, more Naxalites are choosing to join mainstream politics instead of remaining underground. The PWG and the Maoist Communist Center (a faction of the Naxalites, mainly consisting of trade union activists), which work in the same region, eventually merged in 2004 to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist), known as CPI(M), declaring their desire to create a “new” India. Their merger garnered resources from both groups and led a way to declare an Indian version of the people’s war. In 2004, the group declared its mission to fight imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism in India. Scholar Kanu Sanyal has noted that CPI(M), influenced highly by the Naxalites, however “has accepted the parliamentary institutions as the prime tool to bring about a change in the Indian society.” As a result, the Naxal insurgency is fragmented between democratic channels and insurgency.
The Indian government, on the other hand, remains united in its opposition to the insurgency. While administrations have changed, the government’s position on the Naxalites has not; the government remains opposed to the insurgency and determined to address the underlying socio-economic conditions that foment new recruits through policies such as the Backward Districts Initiative. Additionally, the Modi government is “filling critical gaps” in areas of infrastructure within left wing extremist affected states as well.
Despite the government’s stronger hold, in many parts of the red corridor, basic facilities such as water and electricity have mostly been absent. The lack of such services has instead enabled the Naxalites to service the local population with basic facilities. Therefore, the Indian government must continue its development programs in rural and isolated areas if it seeks to weaken the Naxals and disable them from posing any future substantial threat. Any lackluster effort from government officials may allow space for Naxalites to prosper and grow as a larger threat to the Indian government.
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Photo of Indian soldiers at a weapons demonstration via 1-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team
Ayush Manandhar is from Kathmandu, Nepal. His experiences include working with both government and international institutions, including the Embassy of Nepal in the United States, the United Nations Human Settlements Program, and Winrock International, among others. Recently, he served as the Fellow for Intercultural Engagement at his alma mater, Westminster College, where he led events and improved policies for the college’s minority students. As a student, he was the editor-in-chief of Westminster Journal for Global Progress, the flagship journal of the college. Having traveled widely and having seen people face widespread poverty and disparity, Ayush is motivated to uplift the lives of the many underprivileged people around the world. He hopes to write more on policy and politics as a part of this journey.