In preparation for the upcoming Singapore summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, President Trump recently claimed, “I don’t think I have to prepare very much. It’s about the attitude. It’s about willingness to get things done.”[1] However, the U.S. and international community’s complicated relationship with North Korea’s nuclear weapons program suggests otherwise. Trump’s overly optimistic assumption draws parallels to previous claims that diplomatic, economic, and military tools would have prevented the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from originally acquiring the bomb. In light of these shortcomings, it is unlikely that denuclearization efforts will succeed during the summit or in the foreseeable future.
Diplomatic Tools
North Korea has overcome three diplomatic non-proliferation hurdles in their pursuit of the bomb, including the Agreed Framework, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the Six-Party Talks. Although we now know the fate of these strategies in the DPRK context, scholars during the crisis affirmed their efficacy in limiting the regime’s determined proliferation. First, one author reaffirmed the success of the Agreed Framework in 1999, five years after the agreement was reached. C.H. Martin provided three reasons for optimism: North Korea’s declining military strength and economy would make it dependent on foreign aid, governments on both sides had a political interest in it succeeding, and Clinton’s “decoupling” of nuclear weapons from other issues assuaged fears in Pyongyang that the Agreed Framework sought regime change.[2] However, as controversies arose a few years later over whether North Korea cheated on its commitments under the Framework, relations deteriorated with the U.S. and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Agreed Framework subsequently collapsed.[3]
Secondly, the North Korean program overcame limitations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Before the crisis, the NPT boasted a relatively successful record in promoting nuclear restraint among signatories. The only successful proliferators after its ratification were Israel, India, and Pakistan, all of whom refused to sign the treaty. States with nuclear ambitions, such as Egypt and Australia, lost all serious consideration for the bomb after signing the NPT.[4] This success was challenged in 2003 when North Korea left the treaty and became the first former signatory to acquire the bomb. However, even after this clear refutation of an international norm, overly optimistic scholars continued to believe a breakthrough would be possible with nuclear reversal. Some scholars even took the DPRK’s statement at face value that it wanted to give up its nuclear arsenal, rejoin the NPT and submit to IAEA inspections.[5] The reality was quite the opposite.
Lastly, the Six-Party Talks was another diplomatic tool overvalued for its ability to contain a determined North Korea. Attempting to resolve the outstanding issues following the Agreed Framework breakdown and NPT withdrawal, it sought to finally put an end to the DPRK’s nuclear capability. Again, certain scholars refused to see the trend developing in non-proliferation efforts with DPRK. Some continued to reiterate that another diplomatic tool would cease the state’s determination. One scholar even argued the Six-Party Talks could potentially result in “the complete denuclearization of North Korea, a Korean peace treaty, the rehabilitation of North Korea, and the emergence of a Northeast Asian security system.”[6] Instead, Pyongyang abandoned the Six-Party Talks in 2009 and declared its nuclear status in the national constitution three years later.[7] Although this is an extreme example of overconfidence, it remains true that North Korea has resisted diplomatic pressures despite optimism among policymakers and academics.
Economic Tools
North Korea’s dedicated pursuit of a nuclear deterrent also overcame a series of economic non-proliferation tools, namely sanctions and interdictions. The former has been pursued since the beginning of the crisis, as financial and trade sanctions are often imposed following ballistic missile and nuclear weapons testing.[8] However, North Korea has demonstrated its immunity to sanctions. In 2006 the state’s Foreign Ministry claimed, “It is quite nonsensical to expect the DPRK to yield to the pressure and threat of someone at this time when it has become a nuclear weapons state.”[9] In addition to sanctions, interdictions have been deployed as part of the economic toolkit. The original purpose of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), according to a 2005 U.S. congressional report, was to place pressure on political and military leaders through “constricting foreign exchange earnings.”[10] Policymakers pushing for PSI hoped that the resulting pressure would either lead to North Korean capitulation to U.S. demands or the collapse of the regime.[11] Contrarily, over a decade of PSI engagement against North Korea has failed to produce either result.
Economic tools have been unproductive, and possibly counterproductive, in challenging the regime. For instance, increasing economic pressure often soured the talks.[12] In response to coercive sanctions from the international community, North Korea often displays a new willingness to negotiate but instead uses it to ask for more concessions.[13] The actual effect of sanctions is limited, because as T.V. Paul proves, “overwhelming security challenges” lead the state to continue prioritizing proliferation over economic performance.[14] Paul’s conclusion proves an inherent flaw in the utility of economic tools: Nuclear proliferation is mainly a response to such security challenges in the first place. Economic strategies of non-proliferation do not address the primary motivation underlying the program. Further, sanctions in general have been counterproductive. North Korea, as a form of retaliation, seeks to increase the United States’ cost of imposing sanctions. Lacking diplomatic or economic tools, North Korea only has the military option, which is limited to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).[15] Thus, the use of economic pressure creates a counterproductive outcome, where the DPRK continues the exact weapon programs that sanctions are meant to forestall.[16]
Military Tools
Although certain military tools have been deployed against North Korea, such as a Ballistic Missile Defense capability and joint military exercises (which act more as deterrence than counter-proliferation), the toolkit has not included a preventive strike. Some argue North Korea’s determined proliferation would have been contained through use of force. In fact, the United States nearly launched a strike during the 1990s. In 1994, U.S. officials contemplated a preventive strike on the Yongbyon reactor with conventional precision weapons.[17] In 2006, two former Clinton Department of Defense officials urged the Bush Administration to “make clear its intention” to destroy the North Korean Taepodong missile before the regime could deploy it.[18] Policymakers ultimately decided against a preventive strike for fear over another Korean war.[19] Indeed, U.S. administrations that considered the use of force concluded the risks outweighed the benefits.
But the policy debate only addresses one aspect of the military toolkit dilemma. The question still remains: Would a strike have prevented North Korea’s program? Following a strike, there is little reason to believe its nuclear activities would cease. If Israel’s 1981 attack on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor is any indication, North Korea would instead strengthen its resolve for acquiring a nuclear deterrent and move its operations underground – not only making it more difficult to attack but also creating verification issues. As Braut-Hegghammer concludes from the lessons of Osirak, preventive attacks create a “consensus among ruling elites about the need for a nuclear deterrent” and also lead to “a false sense of security, making the international community oblivious to a rapidly intensifying proliferation risk.”[20] A preventive strike would not have contained North Korea’s proliferation activities, but instead would have likely accelerated the program. Since the regime’s acquisition of a nuclear deterrent, the prospect of military action today is virtually inconceivable.
Applicability in Other Contexts
What lessons are to be learned following North Korean non-proliferation failures? Are the shortcomings of diplomatic, economic, and military tools in one context applicable to future contexts? Three concerns suggest the DPRK experience was a unique case. First, North Korea possesses a longer political attention span than the actors attempting to counter its proliferation. Specifically, its centralized state structure and tenured Kim dynasty enable the regime to pursue a long-term nuclear acquisition process. On the other side, U.S. administrations serve short terms, have limited political capital, and are susceptible to competing interests that divert attention away from the DPRK issue. Contrary to this view, however, is the fact that U.S. policy toward North Korea has been fairly consistent over time. Political leaders are replaced but their successors often build on existing strategies while the make-up and purpose of U.S. bureaucracy rarely varies during leadership changes. As noted earlier, Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama utilized similar diplomatic and economic methods. Diplomatic strategies such as the Agreed Framework and Six-Party Talks experienced varying political contexts and featured slightly different strategies of implementation (such as unilateral versus multilateral) but they sought the same objective. The same is true with economic tools, with different sanctions over time pursuing a common goal. This would suggest that non-proliferation strategies are implemented according to long-term objectives.
Second, it is possible that fundamental disagreements among major non-proliferation actors limited the international community’s ability to respond to North Korea’s program. For instance, parties involved with the Six-Party Talks lacked consensus on what actions to pursue because actors sought incompatible outcomes based on clashing interests. China prefers a nuclear DPRK to the unpredictability of regime change. Russia also refuses to seek regime change and claims the nuclear crisis is “exaggerated.”[21] Meanwhile, the United States has historically expressed interest in complete regime change and rigorous constraints on North Korea’s nuclear program. South Korea similarly recognizes the danger of nuclear weapons on the peninsula but has dissenting views on the role of direct aid and the consequences of complete regime collapse. Japan’s stance scintillates between taking a hard and soft approach towards the country.[22] It is true that a collective action problem exists between the actors involved in multilateral negotiations, and it may have limited their ability to halt DPRK proliferation. But these problems are likely to persist in future nuclear confrontations. This drawback raises concerns over the future of multilateralism. Although multilateral strategies are considered more effective than unilateral or bilateral policies, the North Korean case suggests that future strategies will have to rely on less effective but easier to implement policies that involve fewer participating countries. These will continue to be problems for non-proliferation actors going forward.
Third, a critique of this approach insists that non-proliferation tools were uniquely constrained because non-proliferation actors lacked leverage to counter the DPRK’s nuclear activities. North Korea possessed a unique element of inevitability because of such a limited approach. In other crises, the same policies are more effective since diplomatic, economic, and military toolkits are enforced through leverage over the regime. Two reasons for this relate to explanations that “the target’s opportunity costs were insignificant” and the regime’s leadership was irrational.[23] However, as Drezner points out, this constrained leverage is why the United States approached the crisis using carrots instead of sticks. Where outside actors lacked influence, the U.S. gained economic leverage over the DPRK by using carrots.[24] This economic leverage was installed within the Agreed Framework to increase dependence on American aid. As a result, the U.S. also gained diplomatic leverage after the agreement was reached.[25] Indeed, although leverage was not initially present in the North Korean nuclear crisis, it eventually came about and backed up the non-proliferation toolkit directed at the state. This suggests that subsequent breakdowns in limiting the DPRK’s nuclear activities were not caused by a lack of leverage, but because the state was determined to overcome that leverage.
As the Singapore summit approaches, the meeting between President Trump and Kim Jong-un should be considered as part of a larger non-proliferation context that has failed to limit North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Previous diplomatic, economic, and military strategies were unsuccessful despite optimism among scholars and policymakers. Any future negotiation breakthrough, such as a promise to denuclearize, should be considered with caution.
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Gabe Osterhout recently graduated with a M.A. in International Relations from the King’s College London Department of War Studies, where he focused on nuclear proliferation and authoritarianism. This article is excerpted from an academic thesis submitted as part of a degree requirement. Previously, he studied regional security at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv and interned for U.S. Senator Risch on the Foreign Relations Committee. Gabe earned a bachelor’s degree in political economy from the College of Idaho.
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Endnotes
[1] Wagner, John, “Trump Says He Doesn’t Have to Prepare Much for His Summit with North Korea’s Leader”, Washington Post, June 7, 2018.
[2] Martin, C.H., “Lessons of the Agreed Framework for Using Engagement as a Nonproliferation Tool”, Nonproliferation Review 6 (1999), 46.
[3] Davenport, Kelsey, “The U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework at a Glance”, < https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agreedframework>
[4] Walsh, Jim, “Learning from Past Success: The NPT and the Future of Non-Proliferation”, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission paper no. 41, 14.
[5] Ibid., 19.
[6] Grinter, Lawrence E., “The Six-Party Talks and the Future Denuclearization and Rehabilitation of North Korea”, Pacific Focus 23 (2008), 305.
[7] Council on Foreign Relations, “The Six Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program”, < http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program/p13593>
[8] Rennack, Dianne E., “North Korea: Economic Sanctions”, CRS Report for Congress (2006), 5.
[9] Ibid., 7.
[10] Niksch, Larry A., “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program”, CRS Issue Brief for Congress (2005), 4.
[11] Ibid., 4.
[12] Haggard, Stephan, and Marcus Noland, “Engaging North Korea: The Efficacy of Sanctions and Inducements”, in Etel Solingen (ed), Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012), 259.
[13] Paul, T.V., “Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime: The Role of Coercive Sanctions”, International Journal 51 (1996), 448.
[14] Ibid., 454.
[15] Frank, Ruediger, “The Political Economy of Sanctions Against North Korea”, Asian Perspective 30 (2006), 34.
[16] Ibid., 34.
[17] Bunn, M. Elaine, “Force, Preemption, and WMD Proliferation”, in N.E. Bush and D.H. Joyner (eds), Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (Athens: University of Georgia Press 2009), 166.
[18] Carter, Ashton B., and William J. Perry, “If Necessary, Strike and Destroy: North Korea Cannot Be Allowed to Test This Missile” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/21/AR2006062101518.html>
[19] Mazarr, Michael J., “Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea”, International Security 20 (1995), 113.
[20] Braut-Hegghammer, Malfrid, “Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks”, International Security 36 (2011), 130-131.
[21] Grinter, “The Six-Party Talks and the Future Denuclearization and Rehabilitation of North Korea”, 299-300.
[22] Ibid., 300-304.
[23] Drezner, Daniel, “Economic Statecraft and Nuclear Proliferation on the Korean Peninsula”, in D. Drezner (ed), The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 289-292.
[24] Ibid., 302.
[25] Ibid.
Photo by Stefan (fljkr) via Flickr.
Gabe Osterhout is a guest contributor. He recently graduated with a M.A. in International Relations from the King’s College London Department of War Studies, where he focused on nuclear proliferation and authoritarianism. Previously, he studied regional security at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv and interned for U.S. Senator Risch on the Foreign Relations Committee. Gabe earned a bachelor’s degree in political economy from the College of Idaho.