After Boko Haram kidnapped more than 250 girls in Nigeria, activists, celebrities, politicians, and US moms began tweeting and calling for authorities to #BringBackOurGirls. While protests grew in Nigeria, Secretary of State John Kerry called Nigeria’s President Goodluck Jonathan, asking him to accept American assistance. But as social media died down, so did the pressure for officials to take decisive action.
The media’s attention to the kidnapping has disappeared but Boko Haram is still a problem; the terrorist organization has been responsible for an increasing number of attacks. The crisis requires action that is far beyond the current capabilities of the Nigerian military. If Nigeria wants to bring back their girls and combat Boko Haram effectively, President Jonathan must commit his political capital and resources to strengthening both national and regional support for a sustained military effort.
Boko Haram took the schoolgirls from Chibok, a small village located in Nigeria’s most northeastern state, Borno. The state has been plagued with regular incidents of violence and was one of three states named by Nigeria’s President Goodluck Jonathan as being under a state of emergency. Maplecroft, a global risk analytics firm, released a report that rates terrorism in Nigeria as the most deadly – between June 2013 and July 2014, an average of 24 people were killed per attack, while Iraq averaged two deaths per attack during the same period.
Thus far, President Jonathan has failed to back his military and focused his attention elsewhere. Due to the recent state elections in Ekiti, Osun, and now Adamawa (scheduled for October), President Jonathan has been looking out for his party cadres. And although President Jonathan’s own reelection bid will officially begin in November, his party associates are jockeying for political space. His party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), has traditionally dominated Nigerian politics but may face a legitimate threat this time around. The four main opposition parties have combined to form the All Progressives Congress (APC), which has garnered support in the conflict-afflicted north, and among some former PDP members.
A Lot of Talk, A Little Action
The #BringBackOurGirls campaign group has been led by Obiageli Ezekwesili, a former minister under former President Olusegun Obasanjo and critic of President Jonathan; and speculation is rife that Mr. Jonathan has opted for a more muted response to the #BringBackOurGirls campaign fearing that he might appear to be succumbing to the opposition. Ms. Ezekwesili was reported to have been detained by state security services while on her way to London to discuss her group’s recent activities.
President Jonathan’s lack of action has not gone unnoticed and the lack of information about efforts to secure the girls’ release subjected him to some criticism. In response, President Jonathan initiated a PR campaign highlighting his efforts. In June, The Hill reported that the government hired Levick, a Washington-based lobbying firm, for $1.2 million to effect a change in the “international and local media narrative.” Around the same time, the Washington Post posted a letter from Goodluck Jonathan defending his relative silence and asserting that the government was doing everything possible to bring back the girls from Chibok. President Jonathan only met with the parents of the kidnapped girls following a visit from Malala Yousafzai, the young Pakistani girl who was shot in the head by Taliban militants for her support for girls’ education. Now, there are allegations that the parents of the kidnapped girls received over $600,000 from third parties, following their meeting with the president.
The first visible sign of President Jonathan trying to fight Boko Haram finally came on July 15 when he asked the National Assembly to borrow $1 billion to fight the terrorist threat, 20 percent of the Nigerian military’s $6 billion allocated budget. However, much of this funding ends up in the pockets of government officials, sapping the morale of the soldiers on the ground, and the entire budget suffers from lost oil revenue. The Minister of State for Defense claims that the country has not acquired new equipment in the past 25 years.
The military has also resisted institutional change; American officials have noted the difficulty of working with a Nigerian military that lacks trust among the population and is known for its violation of human rights. Overall efforts to provide security assistance have been hampered by systemic mismanagement and stubbornness. Support is thus limited to an 80-man American drone force.
Consequently, the military has remained ill-equipped and under-trained in its fight against the insurgents. The opposition has protested the president’s request, seeing it as yet another security vote that would pocket millions for well-connected military leaders or for President Jonathan’s electoral war chest. It is up to the president to persuade his southern-based supporters that Boko Haram is a threat to them as well. Only then can he build a strong, multilaterally backed counterterrorism force.
Addressing the Problem
Attempting to fill the void of an African-led multilateral effort, French President François Hollande convened a summit in Paris with the presidents of Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad, asserting that these countries would make a genuine effort to share intelligence and provide a suitable military presence near Lake Chad, the area serving as Boko Haram’s base. The capacity of these countries’ militaries, however, is limited. France has its own interests in the region it would like to protect and could potentially apply enough pressure for more expansive action but has already committed resources and troops to the Sahel to combat rebel groups.
Nigeria could also benefit from United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) support, but it will need to show that its own military is already doing everything possible to combat the militants. Creating a mechanism that collects reliable intelligence and deals with militant attacks as they happen would demonstrate that the country is maximizing its own resources.
Nigeria’s Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), a vigilante group of local residents armed with a mix of guns and machetes, has served as a marginally effective ancillary force by providing some local intelligence. The Military Joint Task Force (MJTF), composed of military and police, often lacks knowledge of the area or enemy. Both the CJTF and MJTF, however, have been criticized for harassment and rights violations. There is also fear that the CJTF could turn into outlets of suppressed political oppression – though both Christians and Muslims seem to be united in combatting Boko Haram. President Jonathan must seize this opportunity to channel these mobilized forces in a productive way, rather than leaving them to their own devices.
While seeking to combat the militant threat, the government plans to take a “soft approach to terrorism.” This includes education and economic programs that would provide assistance in affected areas, thereby dissuading potential recruits from joining Boko Haram. Concomitantly, imams and elders are to be co-opted to preach tolerance and non-violence. But without security it may all just be an exercise. Boko Haram has targeted Muslim leaders who have criticized the group’s hardline Salafist ideology. President Jonathan should work with the Borno state government and local leaders to set up rapid response teams capable of evacuating civilians and repelling attacks. Counterterrorism units in Libya, Niger, Mauritania, and Libya as well as the Combined Joint Task Force in Somalia should serve as models for using local forces, demonstrating respect for the local population while policing the area and taking advantage of available intelligence.
Adapting to Boko Haram’s Change in Tactics
Boko Haram is hardly a new problem for Nigeria, yet the militants are more of a threat than ever before. Initial confrontations between the group and Nigerian security forces began in 2003, when militants launched attacks on police stations. In the months that followed, Nigerian soldiers were deployed to militant hideouts in the mountains near the Nigeria-Cameroon border that led to substantial Boko Haram losses.
In turn, Boko Haram adapted a new strategy, sending its members to the Sahel, Sudan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to solicit funds to build madras, mosques, and receive technical assistance from al-Qaeda. In the years that followed, the group built a “state within a state” that “offer[ed] welfare handouts, food, and shelter,” attracting refugees and unemployed youth. Boko Haram has also adopted a decentralized model, allowing them to remain mobile while hiding along the border with Cameroon. While the militant organization evolved, the government failed to adapt to the new threat. Nigeria may have been able to deploy a few battalions back in 2003, but now faces a better-equipped, higher-funded, and more agile threat.
Part of Boko Haram’s new strategy involves the indiscriminate kidnapping of civilians as a source of income. While it might be American and British policy not to negotiate with terrorists, Boko Haram convinced someone (Cameroon, France, or both) to pay $3 million to release a family of seven. The wife of the Deputy Prime Minister of Cameroon was also taken on July 27 (though rescued three days later through a Cameroonian operation). Now, nearly 100 male villagers from Borno have also been kidnapped.
Months after people started calling for Nigeria to #BringBackOurGirls, there still seems to be no concrete plan to deal with Boko Haram or even an acceptance of the gravity of the problem within President Jonathan’s administration. Militant attacks are now reported almost daily, but there is limited information about what the government is doing to fight back. The government asserts that it has pushed Boko Haram “to the fringes of the North Eastern parts of the country,” even though Boko Haram has declared that it has established an “Islamic Caliphate” within Nigerian borders. Nigerians need more than just a hashtag to defeat the militants; they need their president to lead. It is time for President Jonathan to take decisive action, take accountability for the challenge his country faces, and take the fight directly to Boko Haram.
Cameron Vea is a second year Master of Public Policy student at Georgetown University’s McCourt School of Public Policy. He earned his BA in Economics and Political Science from Pepperdine University.