By Emily Manna
The most popular liberal argument regarding the crisis in Iraq seems to be that the United States should keep its nose out of a battle that is not ours to fight. Our nation is understandably weary of wars that have cost us dearly – both financially and in human casualties – and achieved little but to engender deep resentment of the US in many areas of the world. But it is naive to think that we can simply leave Iraq behind. So as the House considers a bill this week to pull all US troops out of Iraq, Americans must consider what role we will play in Iraq’s current crisis.
Within this liberal philosophy there is an undercurrent – perhaps unintentional but nevertheless real – of utter disregard for the United States’ responsibility to those people whose lives have been permanently impacted by our meddling, and a contentment to wash our hands of a situation we helped create simply because American troops are home and out of harm’s way. On the contrary, the US must do everything it can to ensure this crisis ends so that Iraqis can finally live in a just, peaceful society – and we are capable of doing just that. It will require diplomacy of the sort the US isn’t used to employing but if we truly want to do what is right, we’ll do our part to end this violence.
The Origin of Today’s Sectarian Violence in Iraq
One justification for this irresponsible do-nothing plan is the myth circulating around Washington that Iraq was doomed by the very nature of its current state of violence. Across the political spectrum, and particularly on the Democratic side, pundits and experts are in a rush to alleviate President Obama of blame for the devolving Iraq situation by arguing that this sectarian conflict was inevitable, and that perhaps the country and the region just need to let it find its own conclusion. To these analysts, many of whom consider themselves enlightened progressives, the Middle East is made up of nothing more than the stereotypical mix of violent, corrupt, religiously extreme, and irrational players, prone to violence and averse to democracy.
This attitude is ignorant and irresponsible. It shows a refusal to recognize the destruction wrought by Western and American wars and accept the United States’ responsibility to those in whose countries’ it has so obtrusively interfered.
Many of these commentators are correct in one aspect of their argument: the Obama administration is not responsible for creating sectarian violence in the Middle East. Obama can arguably be blamed for ineffectiveness – but the American hand in this mess extends back to the beginning of the Bush administration’s war in Iraq and the disbanding of the Iraqi military and effective banning of all Baath party members in the Iraqi government.
Before the US invasion, Sunni-Shia marriages were extremely common – the Iraqi government estimates that more than 2 million of Iraq’s 6.5 million families are mixed Sunni-Shia families. It was our own ignorant missteps and subsequent feeble attempts at reconciliation that banished humiliated and bitter Sunnis into Iraq’s ungoverned spaces, creating fertile ground for the birth of what is now the Islamic State (IS), formerly the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (commonly known as ISIS), that grew to prey upon the power vacuum in Iraq.
The US supported Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in his bid for office and, in addition to Maliki’s corruption and exclusionist policies, the often brutal nature of the American occupation of Iraq should leave little surprise that groups that oppose a US-backed government would gain popular backing.
We played a significant and direct role in Iraq’s current conflict. So while in the long run liberal Democrats and some libertarian-leaning Republicans are correct in arguing that the US must cease its meddling in the Middle East, we must also face the difficult reality that we have a responsibility to the people whose death toll is climbing by thousands each month.
What the US Should Do Next
To effectively contribute to the resolution of this crisis the US must first drastically increase its humanitarian aid to a country that has seen 800,000 become refugees this year alone. Then, we will be required to resurrect our best diplomatic tactics, which have been collecting dust on the shelf of American foreign policy options for the past decade or more. We’ll need to carefully leverage our relationships with regional rivals like Iran and the Gulf Arab states in order to bring the Iraqi government and Sunni minority to the table.
Many, like Foreign Policy’s Bernard Haykel, argue that seeking Iranian help in finding a solution in Iraq is dangerous given Iran’s positions in various regional conflicts. It’s true that the US must avoid allying itself with Iran militarily in Iraq, but these fears are baseless if we engage diplomatically with both Iran and the Gulf. Iraq may, in fact, present an opportunity to make diplomatic headway in easing the tensions between these adversaries, as not even Saudi Arabia is interested in the further chaotic spread of IS in the region.
Some also contend that working with Iran constitutes a betrayal of Israel – but it’s in Israel’s best interest for the US to reach diplomatic agreements with Iran on both nuclear weapons and the war in Syria. If we can work with both partners to support alternative political groups and leaders in Iraq who still represent the Shia majority but are also willing to be inclusive of the Sunni minority, we may be able to convince Iran to back down from its staunch support of Maliki. (This possibility is discussed more thoroughly by Georgetown Public Policy Review staff here.)
The problem with the Obama administration sending special operations forces to Iraq is that it sends a strong message to Iraqis and the region that the US is taking the side of a sectarian ruler, rather than simply trying to stop the conflict. It may indeed be an unfortunate reality that some level of foreign military presence is necessary to facilitate a ceasefire between IS and the Iraqi government, particularly if Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Caliph of the Islamic State, is unwilling to negotiate. If additional military forces are required, however, they should likely come from NATO, and it should be made very clear that they are entering Iraq only to bring an end to violence there and not as a protective force of the Maliki administration.
If we can successfully achieve an end to the violence and give Iraqis some viable political alternatives that promise to be inclusive of all, mainstream Sunnis will be presented with a real choice of who they’d like to follow and will almost certainly choose an end to violence.
Throughout this process, is it imperative that the only piece, if any, in which the US takes a prominent role is humanitarian aid. For the rest, we must have as limited and understated a presence as possible, choosing only to facilitate a diplomatic resolution between regional and Iraqi powers and support a minimal NATO peacekeeping presence.
As much as we wish such a stain on our history could be removed, no amount of progressive policymaking can erase the US war in Iraq. The embarrassment of the many who foolishly supported or remained silent during the first invasion has inspired a predictable – and correct – rush to condemn a second. A second American invasion on behalf of Maliki’s government would likely be disastrous for the region, but it’s not the only option in Iraq and the US can’t simply shirk its responsibility to this embattled country as we largely have since our troops left in 2011. It’s too late to undo the damage we did in Iraq, but it’s not too late to begin taking responsibility for our war.
Emily Manna is a Master of Public Policy student at Georgetown University.
On the surface this piece appears to have merit. The problem I have with it is that it assumes that we are capable of helping to fix the mess we made in Iraq. This is a bit reminiscent of the pottery barn rule. I personally am not convinced that we are capable of this. If Emily wishes to debate this she should give one or more examples from the past where the US was successful at doing what she proposes. I cannot personally think of any. Vietnam and Lebanon come to mind when I think about this. We acknowledged failure in Lebanon in 1984 and pulled out the of the MNF. By 2010 things had stabilized internally in Lebanon, arguably with the help of UNIFIL I assume that I needn’t elaborate on the mess we made in Vietnam. Less well understood is the fact that a US supported coup against Cambodia’s king ultimately led to the rise to power of Pol Pot and the subsequent death of 25% of the Cambodian population. Cambodia is stable albeit impoverished and corrupt today thanks in part to the UN (UNTAC). US meddling in Libya recently turned that country into a failed state. Historically (Lebanon Cambodia Vietnam) countries bombed or invaded by the US have suffered major loss of lives after the US withdrawal from their territories, but have eventually achieved a form of stability after being left alone (by us) for a decade or so. In my opinion we are far too incompetent to be successful at what Emily suggests here. If she wishes to debate this she should provide examples where her idea has worked in the somewhat recent past.