Violence, Distrust, and Instability: Iraq’s Future in Uncertain Times

It has been more than two years since the last US troops left Iraq, effectively ending a war that carried on for nearly nine years. Even before the final US soldiers pulled out of the country, signs of instability due to a delicate power-sharing arrangement between Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish parties were evident. Today, the future of Iraq is in question.

By Garrett Brinker and Nigel Cory

It has been more than two years since the last US troops left Iraq, effectively ending a war that carried on for nearly nine years. Even before the final US soldiers pulled out of the country, signs of instability due to a delicate power-sharing arrangement between Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish parties were evident. Today, the future of Iraq is in question.

The following two-part series highlights Iraq’s own volatility amidst the spillovers from an increasingly unstable region, focusing on the role of the United States in Iraq’s future leading up to the country’s elections this April. What both countries do during this period and beyond will influence whether Iraq could eventually serve as a model for democracy in the Middle East–a model it is slipping away from at the moment.

The re-emergence of Al-Qaeda amidst the growing Sunni-Shia divisions in Iraq presents stark challenges to the embattled Iraqi government. Compounding this is the Obama administration post-withdrawal hesitance following a messy series of interconnected crises in the Middle East. Simmering sectarian tensions have drawn Iraq closer into the civil war with neighboring Syria. This violence has also exposed the extent of the political divisions between Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki’s predominantly Shia administration and the Sunni political parties who are fighting perceived discrimination and marginalization. All of this is happening shortly before Iraq’s general elections on April 30.

The Security Situation and role of Al-Qaeda-linked groups

Iraq is coming off of its deadliest year since 2008: almost 9,000 Iraqis lost their lives in 2013. Recent instability, especially in Anbar Province, is directly linked to the re-emergence of Al-Qaeda and its partners, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) – although there have been media reports that Al-Qaeda has broken with ISIL. The reappearance of the groups is the result of successful exploitation of political differences, institutional failings, and the civil war in neighboring Syria. Many foreign fighters in Syria have taken up arms under the Al-Qaeda banner, with some ending up in western Iraq. So far, 140,000 Iraqis have fled the violence in Anbar Province as a result of Al-Qaeda’s presence in Fallujah and Ramadi, the capital of Anbar.

The resurgence of Al-Qaeda is not the only reason for the deteriorating security situation in the region. Iraq’s sectarian divide has flared considerably in the last few months. The key cities of Fallujah and Ramadi, in the predominately Sunni Anbar Province, have effectively moved out of the Iraqi government’s control, with both ISIL and local militias competing for power. In late December, violence erupted in Ramadi when police broke up a Sunni protest camp, leaving 13 people dead. The camp had become the symbolic center of Sunni protests since late 2012, following the arrest of several security guards to then-finance minister Rafa al-Essawi—an influential Sunni Arab—on terrorism charges. Leading up to the police operation, Prime Minister Al-Maliki called the Ramadi protest camp, “an Al-Qaeda Headquarters.” Anbar Province Member of Parliament, Ahmad Al-Alwani, was also subsequently arrested on December 28 amid claims of links to Al-Qaeda. Following these events, forty-four Iraqi politicians resigned in protest at both the operation and Mr. Al-Alwani’s arrest.


“We’ve persevered because of a belief we share with the Iraqi people — a belief that out of the ashes of war, a new beginning could be born in this cradle of civilization. Through this remarkable chapter in the history of the United States and Iraq, we have met our responsibility. Now, it’s time to turn the page.”

– President Barack Obama, August 31, 2010


Anbar – the Shia-Sunni nexus of political instability

Politically, the situation in Iraq is fraught. Sunni political leaders have felt the pressure from an active plan to marginalize them within the political apparatus. Until recently, Prime Minister Al-Maliki has largely given up on cross-sectarian politics, opting instead to imprison Sunni politicians, while forcing other prominent officials into exile. But after years of not heeding the US’s advice on reaching out to Sunnis, it appears Al-Maliki is making efforts to broaden his appeal to the Sunni population in advance of the upcoming elections, scheduled for April 30, 2014.

The Sunni community approaches the coming election with a jaded experience in democracy and coalition building. Since Iraq started its experiment with democracy, Sunni political parties have feared increased marginalization, trying various methods in the last two elections to find and settle into a post-Saddam role within the untested Iraqi political system. During the January 2005 parliamentary elections, Sunni turnout was very low; the Sunni-dominated Anbar province experienced turnout as low as two percent. In 2010, the al-Iraqiya List, or Iraqi National Movement, ran under a cross-sectarian party coalition, a mechanism to stake a claim in the Iraqi government. The “partnership” government that the Sunni bloc ended up joining was gradually isolated, while the Al-Maliki-led government adopted a number of measures that consolidated the Shia’s grip on the levers of power. Recognizing a common trend, key Sunni leaders are approaching the coming elections with a more sectarian bend.

The risk of this approach is obvious. It would cement sectarian views on both sides and make it harder to reconcile deepening distrust and suspicions. Shias already see the outbreak of violence in Anbar and elsewhere as confirmation of suspicions of Sunni motives and their lack of commitment to power sharing. But prominent Sunni figures in the current Iraqi government are spearheading an effort to strengthen both Sunni influence and the political stability of Iraq leading up to the April elections, all with the aim of solidifying a Sunni-centric platform for the election. Pending election results – low Sunni turnout, ongoing violence, and acts of sectarian intimidation and marginalization – could lead to a clearer breach between the Sunni community and Iraq’s strained political system and government.

Usama Al-Nujaifi, current Speaker of the Council of Representatives of Iraq, and Saleh Al-Mutlaq, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and head of the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, are prominent politicians fighting for the political future of Iraq and a voice for the Sunni minority. Both Al-Nujaifi and Mutlaq visited the United States in January to champion their platforms for strengthening governance and stability in Iraq. Both brought disconcerting messages about the state of Iraq to the Obama administration and Congress.

Al-Nujaifi painted a pretty bleak picture of Iraq at the Brookings Institution in late January. He described a battle for a legitimate government extending far beyond the conflicts Iraq has encountered with a resurgent Al-Qaeda and local militias. “The psychological situation at this point makes it easier for Al-Qaeda to come back,” Nujaifi remarked. “We need to win back the population in these provinces. We need to give those people their rights to support them at the political, economic, and security levels. And then Al-Qaeda will be defeated within days.”

This obviously isn’t the first time that this region has been the focal point of the central government in Baghdad. Referring to the Anbar Awakening during the Iraq War, Nujaifi stated, “Al-Qaeda was defeated. It was defeated because the people decided to assist the Iraqi government and the government forces at that time. But after the battle ended, the promises made to those people were not kept.” This time around, without the resources and support of the US, it is going to be much harder to win the population over.

This initial breach of trust, built upon by a perceived lack of political inclusiveness and marginalization, underpins Al-Nujaifi’s view that violence, especially in Anbar province, exists because many Iraqis don’t believe they have a supportive and secure central government. Al-Nujaifi considers the selective application of laws and a persistent effort to undermine Sunni political power as fracturing the Sunni community’s trust in the central government, leading Iraqis to turn to violence. “This democracy, some believe, is selective; it is democracy for some and oppression for others,” Nujaifi charged.

Deputy Prime Minister Al-Mutlaq followed in a similar theme. He pointed to the relatively peaceful demonstrations in Anbar last year that turned violent as a result of Al-Maliki’s use of force. “They are demonstrating and expressing themselves in a peaceful and democratic way. If you ignore them, they will feel that democracy is not the solution, so they will go to be extremists.”

Where do we go from here?

The depth of the divisions within Iraq reflects a region experiencing a serious set of simultaneous crises. This makes for a tough ask for the US, as well as the broader international community, to provide the focus, pressure, and resources needed to encourage the reconciliation and stability in Iraq. This context makes the upcoming elections–the first in the country since full US withdrawal–a critical test of Iraq’s future as well as the future of stability.

The second article in this series moves to the critical stakeholders– Al-Maliki, Sunni leaders, and President Obama–and focuses on the challenge that the United States faces in engaging, supporting, and pressuring Al-Maliki. The process of deciphering the competing calls for action (and inaction) as part of a plan to create a coherent regional policy that keeps key allies (whether Israel or Saudi Arabia) happy is an especially daunting task for the Obama administration.

 

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Garrett graduated with a Masters in Public Policy from Georgetown University in 2015. He earned his BA in Political Science from the University of Chicago and worked as the Director of Undergraduate Outreach for Chicago’s Office of College Admissions after graduating. Garrett has previous experience in health policy, urban policy, and political campaigns. His interests currently focus on political strategy, national security policy, froyo, and French Bulldogs.