By Jose Lobo Carrillo
On December 1, 2012, a new presidential term will begin in Mexico. After just 12 years out of power, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which governed the country for most of the 20th century, is returning to the executive office. What does the return of the party that Nobel laureate Mario Vargas Llosa once described as “the perfect dictatorship” mean for Mexico? Is this a setback or just a normal alternation in Mexico’s young democracy?
During the second half of the 1990s—after years of public pressure and few concessions made by the government—wide-reaching electoral reforms were instituted, and the organization of elections was transferred from the government, which constantly engaged in fraud, to the citizens. This reform created the Electoral Federal Institute, which is managed by an autonomous and independent council of citizens. In 1997, and for the first time in modern Mexico, the PRI lost its majority in Congress and, three years later, lost the presidency.
In 2000, voters threw the PRI out of Los Pinos, the Mexican President’s residency, and gave power to Vicente Fox, from the National Action Party (PAN). Fox ran a campaign vowing change and transparency. The transition to a more legitimate democracy and the end of the PRI era raised very high expectations among a Mexican electorate who thought the country was finally on a path toward sustainable development. But sooner rather than later, hope was replaced with disappointment. Some blamed Fox for forgetting the promises he made during his campaign and for not taking advantage of his decisive victory (he won by more than a six percentage point margin). Others pointed to Fox’s inability to end corruption and the inexperience of PAN, which had been an opposition party since 1939, to govern. His advocates accused the opposition in Congress—especially the PRI—of partisan gridlock that blocked every reform attempt proposed by Fox’s government.
The Fox administration undoubtedly enjoyed several successes; a transparency act was passed, and poverty reduction and macroeconomic stability policies were instituted. These were no small accomplishments in a country that had suffered recurring internal financial crises under the PRI regime. Fox’s administration, however, was not able to substantively transform a corrupt political system and an economy based on crony capitalism.
In 2006, the PAN won the presidency again, but this time Felipe Calderón won by only 0.56 percentage points. The runner-up—Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador of the Party Democratic Revolution (PRD)—accused Calderon of electoral fraud and started a movement that included most of PRD legislators against the new government. Once again, the party of the President did not have a majority in Congress, making it difficult to pursue big reforms.
President Calderon’s term ends next week. Despite all the difficulties that his administration faced—like the international financial crisis or the swine flu (H1N1) epidemic—it has recorded significant achievements. The Calderon Administration reformed the pension system for public workers, furthered macroeconomic stability, and achieved universal health coverage (building on a reform that started in 2004). Unfortunately, rising drug-related violence and homicide levels in Mexico overshadowed these accomplishments. President Calderon’s security strategy is too broad and controversial to address here, but it is worth noting that his administration began the biggest reform of the security and justice institutions in recent memory, overcoming years of delays during which drug trafficking and insecurity grew by default in the best case, and by complicity in the worst.
During its 12 years in power, the PAN faced partisan gridlock that made it difficult to pursue a more ambitious agenda, and their structural reforms were blocked in Congress. This perceived lack of action and the combination of disappointment and fatigue from voters led to the party’s defeat in the recent presidential election.
During its 12-year exile from Los Pinos, the PRI kept a substantial number of positions in Congress and always retained the majority of governors in Mexico’s 31 states. Some of these state-level politicians continued PRI’s approach of governing through cooptation or submission of the local legislative, judicial branches and local media.
With its return to the presidency, the PRI will once again face a divided Congress; voters in 2012 did not give a majority to any one party, so this new government will need to form coalitions in order to promote its agenda. Now that they hold executive power, President-elect Enrique Peña Nieto and his team are talking about pursuing some of the exact same structural reforms that the PRI had previously blocked. Two such proposals include energy reform (which, among other changes, would allow the state-run oil monopoly PEMEX to receive private investment) and tax reform (which would broaden the tax base and create a more efficient tax system). Mexico has a large tax evasion problem, and a big part of the budget comes from PEMEX revenues, so tackling these two issues could be a step forward creating a more stable fiscal environment and increasing public investment in key sectors like social security.
Despite these moves, it is unlikely that the incoming government will pursue other much needed reforms; such as breaking up the telecommunications oligopoly (a handful of companies control the TV networks and phone services) or political reform to allow consecutive reelection of legislators and mayors. Without reelection, legislators have been hesitant to make major reforms because their career paths after leaving office depend heavily on party leadership decisions. As a result of these broken incentives, they respond to their parties rather than to the voters that elected them. Mayors, on the other hand, hold three-year terms that also do not offer reelection and are thus unable to plan policy for the long run.
The new PRI government will need to deal with very different state governments than it did last time, when governors who did not follow the executive agenda were quickly removed by the president’s meta-constitutional power. When Mexico transitioned to democracy and governing was decentralized, it created a power vacuum that was immediately filled by the state governors. Despite their expanded influence, many of these governors did not step up to their civic responsibilities and, in turn, chose to lay blame for the country’s woes on the federal government. This time the PRI will need to coordinate with local governments to make federalism work.
The new government will also face a bigger and stronger middle class and a civil society that is now more involved in public affairs and empowered through the use of social media networks. Massive protests—like the ones against Peña Nieto that made headlines during the recent election—are now a regular part of Mexican life and will be very difficult for the new government to ignore.
Finally, the biggest challenge that the PRI is going to face will be the party itself. The PRI managed to appear united before the country during the 2012 campaign. Disparate factions—including governors, union leaders, and members of Congress within the PRI—are soon going to push various agendas. Peña Nieto is going to have to balance and negotiate between these groups and their varying degrees of political influence. Historically associated with corruption and authoritarianism, the PRI will need to show that it can govern democratically. History is giving the PRI another chance, and President-elect Pena Nieto will need to make sure his victory does not mean a setback for Mexico.
Jose I Lobo Carrillo is a first year Master of International Development Policy student at Georgetown Public Policy Institute. He has worked for the federal government of Mexico as an advisor to the Minister of Social Development and in the National Security Council staff in the Office of the President of Mexico under President Felipe Calderon Administration.
Jose I Lobo Carrillo is a second year Master of International Development Policy student at the McCourt School of Public Policy. He has worked for the federal government of Mexico on security and development issues. He is currently interning at the National Strategy Information Center.