Will “Never Again” Hold True in the Central African Republic?

By Kristine Johnston

Twenty years ago, the world stood by as over 800,000 people were killed in the Rwandan Genocide.  The world vowed, “Never again.” And yet, it is never quite so simple as that.  In the two decades that have passed, we’ve seen civil wars begin and end in Sierra Leone and Liberia, sectarian violence in Iraq, chronic instability in Somalia and Sudan, and the use of chemical weapons in Syria’s brutal civil war.

Hidden among these events is an unfolding crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR), where internal violence threatens to evolve into genocide.  An impoverished, land-locked country with few natural resources, CAR is of little strategic importance to the rest of the world.

France is the largest bilateral donor to its former colony, but in reality that economic tie is insignificant.  And with only about 7,000 recorded immigrants from CAR in France (compared to over 400,000 each for Algeria and Morocco, and over 40,000 each for Mali, the DRC, and Cameroon) the political influence of the diaspora is limited.

If the world has failed to stop the fighting in Syria, a country of immense regional and international significance, why would it choose to intervene in CAR? Despite having vowed to prevent genocide in the future, are there factors beyond the humanitarian crisis that would prompt the outside world to take large-scale, decisive action?

A Failed State

Poor governance, violence, and a lack of security have plagued CAR—and neighboring countries—for decades. The movement of rebel groups across borders and the lack of an effective national government and army have continuously undermined efforts by the international community to establish stability and encourage development.  In March of 2013, Michel Djotodia, leader of the primarily Muslim Seleka rebel coalition overthrew CAR President Francois Bozize.  Djotodia then proceeded to disband the Seleka in September, sparking a situation of chaos, violence, and sectarian conflict.  Earlier this month, Djotodia and his Prime Minister stepped down amidst international pressure. Bangui Mayor Catherine Samba-Panza, who was elected interim president by a national transitional assembly on January 20th, replaced Djotodia in a move welcomed by the UN. Samba-Panza, who has been the capital’s mayor since June, will be expected to organize formal elections within the next year.

Even with the deployment of French and African Union troops in December, the violence continues, and Samba-Panza will have a tough task ahead of her.  It is estimated that almost 1 million people have been displaced during the crisis, with over 1,000 people killed in December alone.  The conflict has affected the entire country of 4.6 million people, including the capital city Bangui where half of its residents have fled or are living in camps around the city.  In addition, the conflict has taken a disturbing religious dimension, with the predominantly Muslim ex-Seleka rebels fighting the mostly Christian vigilante troops that have risen up in response.

The Prospects of Intervention

At this time last year, France was commencing an intervention in Mali, where Islamist militants and Al-Qaeda linked groups had taken over the northern part of the country.  The mission was successful in driving the militants back and creating a situation stable enough to allow presidential elections in July, though the groups still have a presence in the north, most recently killing two French journalists.  Still, the intervention received widespread support among the French population and within Mali and its neighbors.  That recent history, combined with painful memories of Rwanda, has provided a rationale for France’s intervention in CAR.

France currently has about 1,600 troops on the ground in CAR.  Their mission, backed by the UN, is to disarm both sides of the conflict and support the African Union, which plans to have 6,000 troops in place by late January.  However, the road to creating stability and security has not been easy.  In late December, thousands of Seleka supporters gathered in Bangui to protest the French intervention and at least 11 international peacekeepers have been killed in the last month.  The violence has become particularly vicious in the capital, where UNICEF has reported the beheading of children.   Meanwhile, the French public’s support for the intervention has waned given the death of two French troops and the lack of visible progress.

The US has limited its engagement in CAR to supporting African forces on the ground.  Despite the recent visit of Samantha Power (US Ambassador to the United Nations) to Bangui, the US has resisted the creation of a full UN peacekeeping force, instead opting to provide financial assistance in the realm of $100 million directly to French and AU troops.

The likelihood of the US providing military support is probably even less likely now, given the recent deterioration of the situation in South Sudan.  The US has deep political interests in Africa’s newest country, which received substantial support under the Bush administration.  Not only was South Sudan an inspiring democratic success story, but Christian groups, humanitarian organizations, and the administration lobbied hard to protect persecuted Christians fighting the Muslim leadership in Khartoum.

In spite of this recent history, US lawmakers are questioning the amount of aid sent to South Sudan given the unrest there.  Even though the conflict in CAR has a decidedly religious characteristic, it is unlikely to engender the same feelings of religious moral obligation to intervene in the American public and the Obama Administration.

Regional Influence and Consequence

South Sudan is not the only problematic neighbor.  CAR sits within a region plagued by chronic instability and violence, where turmoil in one country can easily bleed into its neighbors’ borders.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), to the south, has been plagued by violence over the last several decades.  It has received mountains of aid ($2.3 billion in foreign aid in 2011 alone) partly due to its wealth of gold and diamonds.  Recently, the UN approved a more aggressive approach in the DRC, one that allows UN forces to actively seek out rebels and conduct offensive attacks.  This has been relatively effective, leading the M23 rebel group to sign a peace agreement in December 2013. So far, though, the UN has resisted creating a peacekeeping force specifically for CAR, and is instead relying on French and African Union troops.

To the north, CAR is bordered by Chad, who backed the Seleka rebellion that overthrew the CAR government in March.  The presence of Chadian forces among the peacekeepers in CAR has been controversial, with recent evidence that they may have contributed to the killing of Christian fighters and citizens.  However, Chad has been a strong ally of France, having provided desert-trained troops to help quell the violence in northern Mali.  President Déby also led the effort to oust Djotodia, hosting regional leaders in the capital last week.

The political climate and the interests of CAR’s neighbors matter for several reasons.  First, the responsibility of providing security and peacekeeping forces is increasingly shifting to African countries.  As a result, their political motivations and economic and military resources matter greatly in determining how many outside troops are sent to CAR and how they are perceived by the local population.

Second, the extent to which the West gets involved in CAR depends not only on their own interests in the country itself, but also on the interests of their allies in the region.  Had South Sudan not come undone on its own, the US may have had an interest in preventing the spread of violence and refugees into South Sudan from CAR.  And given the limited economic and political importance of CAR, France may have been less inclined to send troops had it not been pushed by its ally Chad.

Finally, what happens in CAR is not likely to stay in CAR.  Regardless of whether or not CAR is the next Rwanda, one of the crucial consequences of the genocide was the flight of millions of Hutus into the DRC.  Rwanda later used their presence as justification for invading the DRC, sparking a region-wide conflict now termed the Great African War.

As with all the conflicts highlighted here, the current crisis in CAR is complex.  Though the fighting began because of internal causes and has largely been self-contained, the world would be foolish to constrain its attention within CAR’s borders.  To overlook regional dynamics would be to ignore the competing incentives that play into the resolution of the violence as well as the potential destabilizing consequences it could have on CAR’s neighbors.

No one really knows what the solution is, but the current approach is clearly not working.  Whether action comes from France, the UN, or African countries, a change in the status quo must occur.  Otherwise, we may have another country on the list of never agains.

 

 

 

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Kristine Johnston is a Research Analyst at Mathematica Policy Research and a recent graduate of the Master of International Development Policy program at MSPP. Prior to attending MSPP, Kristine worked with Project Muso Ladamunen in Mali and with Social Impact in Washington, DC. Her research interests include international development, impact evaluation, education, infrastructure development, urban planning, and bike sharing.

3 thoughts on “Will “Never Again” Hold True in the Central African Republic?

  1. Very well written piece. Allow me to share the following thoughts:

    I believe that France’s intervention in CAR is a continuation of Hollande’s foreign policy in Africa to revive “Francafrique” as evidenced by France’s intervention in the Ivory Coast and most recently, Mali as you pointed out in the article. CAR may not have much resource as Angola or DRC but it possess significant deposits of Gold and Diamond, much of which remains unexplored. France has a stake CAR stability.

    In terms of finding solutions going forward, I acknowledge that it is a complex crisis and would argue that it is key that the people of CAR play a central role in the process. A successful transition and reconstruction can only be achieved if minimum security conditions are met. In the immediate term, the Security Council should authorize a UN Chapter VII (Obligatory on all member states)resolution, to allow the stabilization mission, MISCA, supported by French forces, to take all necessary means to restore law and order, protect civilians, provide humanitarian relief and document human rights abuses. AU-led forces under MISCA and French forces already on the
    ground should be reinforced to effectively support the stabilization effort. Religious leaders in CAR have demanded that the participation of troops from neighboring Chad, whose government has been accused of backing Seleka, should be reconsidered. As conditions for peace, Christian and Muslim leaders have called on all factions to disarm and agree to work together to promote inter-religious dialogue, education and training on reconciliation and peacebuilding.

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