Iran intensifies its ballistic missile program under the guidance of an aging Supreme Leader with no apparent successor. Can Trump’s chaotic foreign policy deal with Iran as America becomes more distant from its European allies and Russia and China grow bolder in challenging the US?
In February, Vice Admiral Malloy, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, warned of the destabilizing threat posed by Iran’s powerful and intensifying ballistic missile program. Malloy’s warning is one of several from senior officials on the potential use of such missiles and increased Iranian aggression across the region. Iran has for some time been increasing not only its ballistic missile capabilities but also its offensive rhetoric revolving around its potential use.
The report came just before the fourth anniversary of the implementation of the Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Following the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the agreement (which has faced mixed reactions from some experts) and the return of U.S. sanctions, it is no surprise that some within the White House are calling for war. While the 2015 deal temporarily guarantees that any aspirations of a nuclear weapons program in Tehran remain in check, it failed to address other Iranian activities in the region that are causing conflict. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 2231 was meant to address those activities that Iran refused to negotiate as part of the nuclear deal. The resolution affirmed UN support for the JCPOA while also imposing an eight-year conditional ban on Iran’s ballistic missile program and a five-year arms embargo on heavy conventional weapons that gives the UN Security Council authority to review any transfers to Iran. UNSC 2231 also centralized several previous Security Council resolutions pertaining to Iran’s nuclear program, aspects of its regional behavior, and its ballistic missile program.
The international sanctions regime has had limited success. Iran has continued to intensify its ballistic missile program in violation of UNSC 2231, which calls upon Iran “not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology.” Instead, Iran has conducted multiple tests over the last several years. Iran is emboldened by recent developments in the international arena, including the United States’ withdrawal from the Middle East and the divisions President Trump’s policies have created with European allies. Growing Chinese and Russian support will also likely further encourage Tehran to pursue policies that run counter to those preferred by the West.
Iran’s missile program
Iran acquired its first ballistic missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and used them to counter Iraqi air superiority. Realizing the potential, Tehran went on to create an indigenous missile program with the help of North Korea and later Russia and China. Iran argues that its ballistic missile program is for defense and deterrence, but historically such a program is developed in tandem with a nuclear weapons capability as a method of delivery. This is especially important given Iran’s alleged history of a secret weaponized nuclear program in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran is party.
The United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Bahrain, and several European powers see Iran’s ballistic missile program as a provocation and a serious offensive arsenal. Iran’s continued development, testing, and proliferation of ballistic missiles has reinforced this view. Although Germany, France, and the United Kingdom disagree with the U.S. decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, they regard Iran’s ballistic missile program and regional activity as unacceptable.
Iran also has a long history of supporting groups that many in the West consider to be terrorist organizations. This includes forces that now act as Iran’s proxies within what should be sovereign independent states in the region. Under Iranian patronage, several major proxies — including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, and the Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyoun Brigades in Syria — have built up immense capabilities in their own right, greatly contributing to conflict in the region despite past and current international arms embargos. This includes their use of ballistic missiles and heavy conventional weapons in Yemen and Lebanon. The expiring arms embargo on Iran would likely allow for increased shipments of heavy arms that originate from Iran to these proxies.
Obstacles to progress
The growing rift between the U.S. and its European allies, largely caused by the unpredictable foreign and national security policy of the Trump Administration, is contributing to a lack of resolution on Iran. The European states that are parties to the JCPOA have been adamant about the need to preserve the deal, against the wishes of President Trump and his administration. The American withdrawal left a bitter taste in the mouth of European leaders who had scrambled to find a solution that would placate the United States—most notably, a successor deal that would address Iran’s ballistic missile program and regional activities.
Iran’s continued testing of ballistic missiles is not going unnoticed, especially in Paris. Tensions are also rising between European states and Iran over alleged Iranian terror and intelligence activities in the European Union, and Germany has banned the Iranian airline Mahan Air because of security concerns. If Iran continues on its current trajectory, it will likely face some form of European backlash, but this alone is unlikely to cause major change. Trump’s withdrawal from the original deal, coupled with his mistreatment of Europe and allies in general, has made progress on the missile issue difficult.
The ongoing dysfunction that permeates Trump’s White House has also emboldened China and Russia, which will continue to challenge the United States on the international stage. Both states see an opportunity to strengthen relations with Iran, a state that some experts believe shares their interest in weakening the current world order and U.S. hegemony. In the absence of the restrictions placed by UNSC 2231, the Iranian market would present a lucrative arms export opportunity for both China and Russia. Such a development is extremely problematic for the United States and its allies. China and Russia, which were both among the world powers that reluctantly negotiated the JCPOA with Iran, have little interest in renewing either the arms embargo or the restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile program. It is therefore unlikely that an agreement can be reached within the UN Security Council, where China and Russia can block any possible compromise, especially given the current strained relations between them and the United States.
What will Iran do next?
Iran has thus far taken the opportunity presented by the JCPOA to expand both its ballistic missile program and its regional activities, violating UNSC 2231 and the UN arms embargo on Yemen in the process. Though Iran has not seen the full benefits of JCPOA because of the U.S. withdrawal from the deal and renewal of sanctions, it has used the agreement as cover to both play the European powers against the United States and to successfully advance its regional position. This strategy allows Iran to continue upgrading its ballistic missile program.
Given the unlikelihood of imposing new sanctions, there is only one possible scenario in which this reality could change: if Iran withdraws from the JCPOA. While Iran’s government has denied that it is considering withdrawal at the moment, it is possible. Iran has not benefited as much as it expected from the implementation of the deal and subsequent sanctions relief, and hardline elements within the Iranian political sphere have been against the JCPOA from the very beginning. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is 79 years old and not in the best of health, and his expected successor, Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, recently died from cancer. An unclear line of succession, coupled with increased economic hardship and an ongoing devastating drought, may push the country over the edge. This could lead the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and other extreme elements to make a bid for power if they felt the regime – and by extension the Islamic revolution – was under existential threat, a development that would almost certainly lead to military conflict.
Europe has finally delivered on the long-awaited alternate payment mechanism to circumvent U.S. economic sanctions. The Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, established by the European states to facilitate non-U.S. Dollar trade with the Islamic Republic, will not offset all the economic losses Iran has sustained and will likely continue to incur over time. If U.S. sanctions continue to be effective, they will amplify the Iranian domestic economic crisis over time, worsening an already difficult situation for the regime. It is clear that there is a chance Iran will withdraw from the nuclear deal, especially in a controlled and incremental manner. If that happens, European and American interests would realign a renewed effort to constrain not only Iran’s nuclear program but also other activities, such as Iran’s ballistic missile program or regional activities. Iran’s continued activities and aggressive rhetoric on display during this past week’s celebrations marking 40 years since the Islamic Revolution only reinforce this possibility. A U.S.-led strike (or a sanctioned strike conducted by Israel) may be an option that is once again “on the table” and is considered more seriously under the Trump Administration than his predecessor. But given President Trump’s propensity for a chaotic foreign policy, even a realignment of interests between Europe and the United States makes any renewed efforts far from certain.
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Photo of former U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley speaking about Iran’s missile program by EJ Hersom via DoD News.
Ezra Friedman is a candidate for an MSc in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He was previously a research assistant at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, Israel. His areas of interests include Israeli and American foreign and security policy, Middle East regional dynamics, sanctions regimes, energy, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.