The future of U.S. policy in Syria: Withdrawal?

Palmyra-tedmor-Syria

As the Syria conflict persists alongside the incipient defeat of the Islamic State terror group, the United States retains de facto control over almost a third of Syrian territory. Four other major outside actors have their own conflicting interests in the country as well, which begs the questions: How will the United States navigate this potentially explosive quagmire? And, will these realities permit the fulfillment of President Trump’s recent withdrawal order?

The situation in Syria today is a complicated tapestry of conflicting goals, fractious alliances, and hard power on the ground. Despite the entrance of a variety of outside actors with the supposed intent of returning stability to Syria after seven long years of civil war, there is no definite end in sight. Instead, these foreign powers – Iran, Russia, Turkey, Israel and the United States – are all active within Syria and “spoiling for a fight,” in the words of Colonel Richard Outzen, a Syria expert who spoke at a panel held by the Middle East Institute in December 2018. Now that the United States has largely accomplished its original goal of defeating the infamous Islamic State group – hereafter referred to as Daesh, an Arabic acronym for the organization – a reformulation in U.S. policy on Syria has been underway. Although initially it seemed as though U.S. presence in Syria would continue, President Trump upended this view when he announced the withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Syria in December 2018. Ultimately, Iranian presence in Syria will likely prove Trump’s plans to withdraw detrimental to the long term interests of the United States.

The History of the Conflict

In 2011, the Arab Spring uprisings in other countries inspired protests in Syria, which quickly spiraled out of control, leading to armed conflict. Over the course of the next few years control over the country was fractured: Some portions remained under the control of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and others were ruled by various loose coalitions of rebels, including Daesh. Then, 2013 became witness to the first of the Syrian regime’s chemical attacks on its own citizens. And, although this violated President Obama’s stated “red line,” it did not provoke intervention; the failure to act has come back to haunt the United States in the form of a largely lawless swath of territory where Daesh germinated and which has seen a mass exodus of refugees to Europe. In June 2014 Daesh proclaimed its caliphate, following the organization’s stunning military gains in Syria and Iraq. In September of the same year the United States took the lead in an international coalition with the express intent to “degrade and ultimately destroy” Daesh, marking its military entrance into the Syria quagmire; however, the coalition was unwilling to deploy traditional ground forces and instead backed the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a group of militias led by the Syrian Kurds’ People’s Protection Units (known as the YPG).

Capitalizing on the West’s unwillingness to provide support to the Syrian opposition, Russia began a military intervention in support of al-Assad, its long-time Syrian client, in September 2015. In the years since, the al-Assad regime and its various allies have been able to roll back rebel gains, as today the city of Idlib, in northwestern Syria, is the final remaining rebel stronghold. Meanwhile, the coalition has succeeded in driving Daesh out of all of its strongholds in both Iraq and Syria.

The Kurds – a distinct ethnic group long repressed in Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran – have also been expanding their territory in the northeastern part of Syria. This has raised Turkey’s ire as it has long struggled with Kurdish insurgency. In early 2018, Turkey’s increasingly autocratic and embattled president, Recep Tayyip Erdoĝan, sent his military into northern Syria to roll back Kurdish gains, culminating in the seizure of Afrin, a strategic city in northwestern Syria which had been held by Kurdish forces.

The Key Players Today

The remaining non-Kurdish rebels and their patron, Turkey, are arguably in the toughest spot: Only the city of Idlib remains under rebel control; and, in the east, Turkey remains concerned with preventing the emergence of any sort of independent Kurdish region along its border. Erdoĝan has gone so far as to threaten a new military campaign against the Kurds east of Afrin and, assuming the United States withdraws from Syria, this is almost sure to occur. While the rebels under Turkey’s control would like to see al-Assad’s ouster, the likelihood of this is substantially reduced by a U.S. withdrawal. Thus, they will be forced to rely on U.N. resolutions calling for a Syrian-led peace process during any future negotiations, lacking the hard power to do much more.

The Syrian regime is, ironically enough, in a position not dissimilar to that of the rebels. Its military forces have been severely weakened by years of conflict; in fact, most observers predicted its fall at the hands of the rebels prior to the Russia intervention. The Russians are interested in asserting themselves on the world stage, in addition to maintaining their last bastion of influence in the Middle East. Now that President Trump has clearly declared his disinterest in Syria, Putin will likely greenlight the seizure of Iblib.

Iran’s motives for staying in Syria are of most concern for the United States and its chief ally in the region, Israel. Iran seeks to increase its standing regionally, and its influence in Syria is of critical importance to its designs. The much-talked-about land bridge from Tehran to Beirut — often referred to as the Shi’a Crescent — runs through Iraq and Syria. The recently announced U.S. withdrawal will likely allow Iran to make this connection, much to Israel’s chagrin, as it views the theoretical Shi’a Crescent as an attempt to encircle Israel and make good on its threats to destroy the Jewish nation. Israel’s goal, therefore, remains straightforward: prevent Iran from establishing a lasting presence in Syria. To this end it has undertaken more than 200 air strikes against mostly Iranian targets in Syria since 2017. The existential nature of Iran’s threat to destroy Israel leads one to believe that a stepped-up military campaign may be in the offing should the U.S. withdrawal occur.

Initially, it seemed as though U.S. presence in Syria would continue: The newly appointed U.S. special representative to Syria, Jim Jeffries, recently echoed National Security Advisor John Bolton when he said that the U.S. military will not withdraw from Syria until all Iranian-commanded forces have left. For years the United States has been using the SDF as its proxy in Syria despite the fact that Turkey – a NATO member – has condemned the YPG as a terrorist group. For this reason, many observers were led to believe that the United States would have to continue its balancing act in Syria so as to not leave its Kurdish allies in the lurch. Trump, however, upended this conventional wisdom in late December 2018, leading to a storm of condemnation – with one notable exception: Vladimir Putin, who praised the decision.

What Happens Next?

The President’s decision to abruptly withdraw from Syria was a mistake that caught the world, including many in his own administration, off guard. It even led to the resignation of several White House officials, including former Secretary of Defense Mattis. Others are still holding out hope that the decision will be reversed, including close allies of the President such as Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.). For a number of reasons, the President’s plans to withdraw from Syria are premature: The Daesh is yet to be conclusively defeated, as the organization has previously proven capable of transitioning from a territory-ruling insurgency to a more traditional terrorist organization; the United States’ closest ally, Israel, remains threatened by Iran; and al-Assad, a murderous tyrant, will remain in power, sending a dangerous message to other dictators around the world. However, assuming the President’s decision holds, the positions of Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the al-Assad regime will become markedly stronger, while the rebels and the Syrian Kurds will quite possibly find themselves militarily steamrolled. The Kurds have, in the days after Trump’s announcement, turned to al-Assad and asked them for assistance in combating the Turkish threat.

Once the United States vacates Syria, the result – whether it be expanded Turkish or regime control in the region – will eventually give way to negotiation. The easiest issues to resolve will be refugee return and reconstruction. Turkey, the European Union, and the United States are all likely to support refugee return to the country, while the regime and its supporters will be enticed by the promise of reconstruction funding – as neither Russia nor Iran are in a position to provide the regime with the $250 billion required to rebuild the country. Such progress would not, however, alleviate the core issue for the United States: Iran. Given the isolationist tendencies of the current administration, it is plausible that the United States will threaten to withdraw from the peace process and refuse to give reconstruction aid so long as Iran remains in the country. If this comes to pass, al-Assad will continue to play host to foreign forces, which is likely to lock Israel into another low-intensity conflict.

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Photo of the ancient ruins in Palmyra, Syria by Flickr user David Holt

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Grant Marthinsen graduated from Allegheny College in 2017 with a degree in International Studies (MENA) and a Religious Studies minor. His academic work has focused on the rise of the Islamic State group, in addition to the study of Arabic, which he has pursued both in the U.S. and abroad.