By Amir Fouad
Despite the negative connotation of the name Mubarak derived on account of the recently-ousted and very much despised former president of Egypt, the word “mubarak” in Arabic (lit: “blessed”) is otherwise ubiquitously used in Egypt and throughout the Muslim world in the most joyous of contexts. It is most often heard in conjunction with holidays and holy months – i.e. “Ramadan Mubarak” – and its grammatical cousin “mabrook” is wielded whenever congratulations are in order. During Ramadan last August, Egyptians muttered a phrase that at once characterized their growing cynicism of post-revolution stagnation as well as their enduring sense of humor during difficult times: “Ramadan Tantawi” they said, in reference to Hussein Tantawi, the much maligned head of the ruling military council.
It is that ruling body – the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) – that has replaced Mubarak’s name on the placards of Tahrir Square in the wake of the Revolution’s one-year anniversary. And Mr. Tantawi, who oversees the military’s increasingly tight grip on power as well as SCAF’s political marriage of convenience with the Muslim Brotherhood, finds himself in shoes eerily similar to Mr. Mubarak a year ago. The problem was summed up nicely by Egyptian activist Esraa Abdel Fataah at the Middle East Institute’s annual conference here in Washington two months ago: “the Revolution phase will continue as long as SCAF is in power.” The question is whether and when SCAF agrees to relinquish its power and how the newly elected Islamic parties will fill the void.
Election Aftermath
Voting for Egypt’s lower house of Parliament, the People’s Assembly, began in November. The six-week, three-stage process would be difficult for anyone to wrap their head around, let alone a democratically nascent nation suffering from political, post-revolution exhaustion and lack of expertise. Ms. Abdel Fataah lamented at the time the inability of the electoral process to reach more than 18 million of Egypt’s 80+ million inhabitants, with new parties completely devoid of time, capacity and resources (in the end, 28 million people participated in the elections).
The one exception to that trend of disorganization and confusion was the Muslim Brotherhood, the most harmonized of all opposition groups during the Mubarak era; its political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party capitalized on its organizational superiority and took in 47 percent of the vote. The ultra-religious Salafist movement and its Al Nour Party came in second with a quarter of the seats. Liberal secular groups, which so adamantly fueled the revolution and stole the hearts of the international community, came in a distant fourth.
SCAF and the Islamic parties are not allies so much as players who recognize the mutual benefits of the other. In facilitating the electoral process (albeit rushed and complicated), SCAF could claim a commitment to democracy. And in capitalizing on its lopsided advantage, the Islamic parties saw in SCAF’s empty gesture a quick and easy path to power. Now, as the two further entrench themselves at the helm of Egyptian politics and pro-democracy groups are raided and antagonized, the international community is wondering if the era of an Islamic, theocratic Egypt has arrived.
Tunisian Example
Last October, Tunisia also completed its first, post-revolution free elections. Like Egypt, secular parties were marginalized and unsuccessful and religiously oriented parties won parliamentary majorities. Unlike Egypt, the elections – up to and including their 1500 international observers – were considered a great success, with tears of pride and joy filling the streets in the aftermath. In addition, no one seems to worry that Tunisia is slipping down an extremist path.
The secret of the victorious Ennahda Party in Tunisia, which is looking to follow the Turkish model, is its successful bridging of Islam and modern democracy and its recognition that Tunisians do not want to have to choose between the two. It has no desire to replace secular autocracy with theocracy and believes religion is personal; nevertheless, it understands that Tunisia is a religious society and includes references to Arabic and Islam in the new Constitution as simply “descriptions of reality.” What’s more, it operates under a system in which the military remains firmly removed from politics.
The successes of Egypt’s tiny North African cousin offer many lessons for SCAF, the Muslim Brotherhood and disillusioned Egyptian revolutionaries. Firstly, a secular military junta is hardly differentiable from a secular autocracy and unless SCAF admits to its inability to govern, Egypt will remain in a perpetual revolution. Secondly, Egyptians are not eager to replace their humorous-yet-sad mantra of “Ramadan Tantawi” with the name of a theocratic leader from the Muslim Brotherhood. If they do, the revolution will be perpetually ongoing. Finally, even the most dedicated and passionate secular Egyptian revolutionaries must realize that their country – like Tunisia – is a religious one. As such, including Islam in public life would be an honest reflection of the country’s religious persuasion, but it does not have to mean repressive theocratic dictatorship à la Iran. All the parties involved should recognize this fact moving forward if they hope to build a truly representative and successful Egypt.
Established in 1995, the Georgetown Public Policy Review is the McCourt School of Public Policy’s nonpartisan, graduate student-run publication. Our mission is to provide an outlet for innovative new thinkers and established policymakers to offer perspectives on the politics and policies that shape our nation and our world.